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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER DEFENDANT:
A MODEL STATUTORY APPROACH TO
PUBLIC DEFENDER MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, this
[Supreme] Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person
accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel
appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. That a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused,
however, is not enough .... An accused is entitled to be assisted by
an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Rick Teissier is a public defender for the Orleans Indigent Defender
Program (OIDP) in New Orleans, Louisiana.2 At the time of his appointment
to represent Leonard Peart, Teissier was handling seventy felony cases. 3
Between January 1 and August 1, 1991, Teissier represented 418 defendants,
and of these he entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment.4 Moreover, he had at
least one serious case set for trial on every trial date during this period.' It is
not extraordinary for Teissier's clients to be incarcerated for anywhere between
thirty to seventy days before he can meet with them.6
OIDP operates under a public defender model.' OIDP provides no funds
for expert witnesses, and OIDP's library is inadequate.' Further, OIDP only
has enough funding to employ three investigators, who are responsible for
assisting in more than 7000 cases per year in the ten sections of the Criminal
District Court, plus cases in Juvenile Court, Traffic Court, and Magistrates'
1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
2. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).
3. Id. at 784. Peart, an indigent, was charged with armed robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated
burglary, attempted armed robbery, and first degree murder. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 784. The trial court noted that a "serious case" is one involving an offense necessarily
punishable by a jail term that may not be suspended. Id. at 784 n.3. Such offenses include first and
second degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of
heroin. Id.
6. Id. at 784.
7. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).
8. Id.
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Court.9 Consequently, in a routine case, defenders like Rick Teissier receive
virtually no investigative support. '
These crisis conditions at OIDP are representative of public defender
systems across the country." Due to the heavy caseloads, public defenders are
often unable to provide thorough representation.' 2 This raises the question of
what remedies should be available to indigent defendants, such as those
represented by OIDP, who receive inadequate representation. Perhaps the most
common refuge of the indigent defendant is the post-conviction claim, either
through a direct appeal or a writ of habeas corpus,' 3 that trial counsel was
ineffective in handling the case in violation of the Sixth Amendment.' 4 When
9. Id.
10. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the indigent defense services in Section E of
Orleans Criminal District Court, where Teissier was assigned to represent Peart, were so lacking
that a rebuttable presumption arises that indigent defendants represented by OIDP attorneys do not
receive effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 791. But, ironically, the
court noted that Peart himself did receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed him by the
Constitution. Id. at 785 n.4. The court noted that when defenders apply their full efforts, they
generally provide effective assistance of counsel. Id. That Peart could receive effective assistance,
while Teissier's other clients do not, reflects the fact that defenders must select certain clients whom
to give more attention. d. The court noted that each of Teissier's clients was entitled to the same
quality of defense services received by Peart. Id. For a further discussion of the Pearl case, see
infra note 190 (discussing the judicial response to public defender workloads).
11. NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS AND
COMMON SENSE: AN UPDATE 3 (1992) [hereinafter NLADA REPORT]. According to a 1990
defender office survey, conducted by the Institute of Law and Justice for the National Institute of
Justice, increasing caseloads are still a major concern of public defenders, and financial resources
to effectively handle the caseloads continue to be inadequate. Id. For a further discussion of the
caseload and funding problems facing most public defender offices, see infra notes 186-90 and
accompanying text.
12. Patricia B. Carlson, Comment, Liability of Government-Appointed Atoreys in State Tort
Actions, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136, 144 (1980).
13. A habeas corpus proceeding is a form of collateral attack, instituted by the prisoner, to
determine whether the prisoner is being unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
14. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER §
4.1, at 58 (1987). The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Anything that counsel did which could have conceivably affected the verdict may be raised in
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. HALL, supra, § 4.1, at 59. Ineffective assistance of
counsel is a common claim made by and against the best attorneys, usually without success. Id. at
58. A criminal defense attorney should assume that a client, who is sentenced to a substantial prison
term and is unable to reverse a conviction on other grounds, will bring an ineffective assistance
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/9
1994] PUBLIC DEFENDER MALPRACTICE 513
successful, these claims usually result in either the reversal of a conviction or
the granting of a new trial.'s This in turn raises the question of whether an
indigent defendant represented by a public defender should be entitled to an
action for damages against a negligent public defender.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Ferri v. Ackerman,'6
most damage suits against public defenders were brought under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 17  Under section 1983, the indigent defendant was
required to prove that the state public defender's conduct was "under color of"
state law, and that the defender's conduct was so inadequate that it violated the
indigent's constitutional right to counsel."' In Ferri, however, a unanimous
Supreme Court held that federal law does not provide immunity for court-
appointed counsel in state malpractice suits. 9 Significantly, the Ferri Court
noted that when state law creates a cause of action, the state remains free to
define defenses to the claim, including the defense of immunity.
State courts are split on the issue of whether public defenders are immune
claim. Id. at 58-59. For a discussion of the standard of proof for ineffective assistance of counsel,
see infra note 131. Fora discussion of the relationship between ineffective assistance of counsel and
malpractice, see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
15. Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the
IndigentDefendant, 61 TEM. L. REv. 1171, 1203 (1988).
16. 444 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that federal law does not provide immunity for court-
appointed counsel in state malpractice suits).
17. Ronald E. Mallen, 7he Court-Appointed Lawyer and Legal Malpractice-Liabiliy or
Immunity, 14 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 59, 59 (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
Among the few pre-FerM malpractice cases against public defenders are Spring v. Constantino,
362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975) (holding that public defenders are not immune from malpractice
liability), and Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that
public defenders, like judges and prosecutors, are immune from malpractice liability). See infra
notes 97-i04 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the text of the Sixth Amendment. However,
in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court foreclosed the section 1983
avenue of relief for indigent defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 133-37 (discussing Polk
County).
19. Ferni, 444 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes 41-71 for a
general discussion of immunities and attorney malpractice.
20. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 198. See infra text accompanying notes 118-29 (discussing Fern).
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from liability in state malpractice suits.2' State courts that have granted
immunity have argued that judges and prosecutors enjoy immunity to allow them
to effectively perform their function of impartially administering the law. These
courts analogize that public defenders, like prosecutors and judges, perform a
similar function and thus should enjoy the same immunity.' These courts have
also relied on the public defender's duty to take on any client as justifying public
defender malpractice immunity.' Further, it is argued that the time, money,
and energy consumed in defending such malpractice suits would further deplete
the already sparse resources available to defend indigent criminal defendants.'
Courts granting immunity have also cited the need for public defenders to
fearlessly litigate their cases,' as well as the need to have competent counsel
willing to represent indigents.' In addition, courts granting immunity have
alleged that if public defenders are not granted malpractice immunity, the
"floodgates" will be opened to frivolous claims by convicted indigents.'
Further, it is maintained that the indigent remains free to pursue other avenues
of relief, such as ineffective assistance of counsel.'
In contrast, courts that have declined to extend immunity to public
defenders have held that, once appointed, the public defender functions purely
21. Some courts have refused to grant immunity. See Spring, 362 A.2d at 874-75 (holding that
public defender is not a public official); Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting a strong indication of a trend away from immunity); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735 (Pa.
1979) (holding that once appointed, public defender functions purely as a private attorney).
Other courts have extended malpractice immunity to public defenders. See Browne v. Robb,
583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990) (holding that public defender enjoys qualified immunity under state tort
claims act), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991); Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that significant differences between public defender and private counsel require extension
of immunity to public defender); Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105-06 (holding that duty of public
defender, like judge and prosecutor, is to insure that impartial justice is done). See infra notes 97-
147 and accompanying text.
22. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 777 (citing Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973)); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
23. Browne, 583 A.2d at 951; Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775; Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105;
Reese, 406 A.2d at 743 (O'Brien, I., dissenting).
24. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776-77; Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
25. Browne, 583 A.2d at 951; Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 777 (citing Brown, 463 F.2d at 1048-
49); Reese, 406 A.2d at 743 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
26. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776-77 (Minn. 1993); Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105; see
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1979).
27. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776 (citing Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 902 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977)); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978).
28. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776; Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105. See infra note 131 (discussing
the ineffective assistance of counsel cause of action).
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as a private attorney." While judges and prosecutors are officers of the state,
whose duty is to see that impartial justice is done, public defenders, much like
private attorneys, are advocates, and therefore they are no more entitled to
immunity than are private attorneys." These courts further reason that, even
though public defenders are overworked and underpaid, it would be unfair to
punish indigent defendants for the deficiencies in public defender offices."
Further, the threat of possible malpractice liability ensures that public defenders
will vigorously pursue their cases,32 and the availability of other alternatives,
such as bar association discipline and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
cannot substitute for a civil remedy.
33
Though the unique characteristics of public defender offices require that
public defenders be treated somewhat differently from private counsel, public
defenders should be subject to malpractice liability. Section II of this Note will
provide background on immunities in general, including a discussion of common
law immunities and the current state of immunities law.' Also, the attorney
malpractice cause of action will be discussed therein," as well as the origin
and characteristics of modem public defender systems.' Section III of this
Note will trace the evolution of public defender malpractice liability, from the
foundational cases Spring v. Constantino, Ferri v. Ackerman, and Reese v.
Danforth, to the most recent treatment of the issue in Dziubak v. Mor. 31
Section IV of this Note will then evaluate and scrutinize the arguments advanced
by courts granting malpractice immunity to public defenders.' Finally, in light
of these criticisms, Section V of this Note will propose a model statute that will
strike a balance between the unique characteristics of modern public defender
offices, and the indigent defendant's right to recover damages for mal-
practice. 3  Further, this model statute will outline a standard of proof for
indigent recovery and will provide for state indemnification of malpractice
awards against public defenders, except where the public defender's conduct
29. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 874-75, 878 (Conn. 1975); Reese v. Danforth, 406
A.2d 735, 738-39 (Pa. 1979); see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981).
30. Spring, 362 A.2d at 874-75; Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); White v. Galvin, 524 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Reese, 406 A.2d at 738-39.
See Polk Coway, 454 U.S. at 321-22; Fern, 444 U.S. at 202-04.
31. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting); Reese,
406 A.2d at 739-40.
32. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
33. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting); Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108
(Pa. 1993).
34. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 97-147 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 148-263 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 264-92 and accompanying text.
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constitutes willful misconduct.'
II. BACKGROUND: IMMUNrrIES, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE, AND
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEMS
A. Immunities
United States courts have regularly borrowed immunities from English
precedent.41 Courts grant certain public officials immunity to enable them to
effectively perform their duties, and only those who exercise policymaking
functions are entitled to immunity.' Presently, most public officials enjoy only
qualified immunity, under which government officials are immune from damages
liability when performing their discretionary functions.43 However, qualified
immunity does not extend to public officials when their conduct violates clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights." Hence, under qualified
immunity, public officials are not liable for mere mistakes in judgment, but they
can be liable if they knew or should have known that their actions violated
clearly established laws.' In most cases, qualified immunity is sufficient to
protect both the officials who are required to exercise discretion, and the public
interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority .
However, some officials perform special functions which, because of the
similarity to functions that historically would have been immune, deserve
40. See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text.
41. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984).
42. Carlson, supra note 12, at 138-39.
43. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993) (holding that prosecutors' actions,
in determining whether bootprint at scene of crime was that of defendant, were merely administrative
and investigatory in nature, rather than closely associated with the judicial process, and were
therefore only entitled to qualified immunity; and that prosecutors' statements to the press did not
involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions in
preparation of these functions, and therefore such statements were only entitled to qualified
immunity). Though Buckky dealt with immunities under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, it
is instructive because section 1983 immunities are determined by immunities recognized at common
law: "Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate immunities 'well grounded in history and reason.'
Certain immunities were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that 'we presume
that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish' them." Id. at 2612-13
(citations omitted).
44. Id. at 2613 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)).
45. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). The Butz Court held that federal officials,
though not liable for mere mistakes in judgment, may not 'with impunity discharge their duties in
a way that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should
know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule." Id. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 139.
46. Buck/ey, 113 S. Ct. at 2613 (citing Buz, 438 U.S. at 506).
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absolute protection from damages liability.47 Absolute immunity at common
law was confined to participants in legislative,4 high level executive,' and
judicial proceedings."' Absolute judicial immunity currently extends in certain
situations to judges,5' prosecutors, 2 grand jurors,'3 and witnesses.' Such
47. Buckiey, 113 S. Ct. at 2613. "The official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of
showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question." Id. (quoting Buns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478,486 (1991)). In determining whether certain actions of government officials fit within
a common-law tradition of absolute immunity, or only qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has
applied a functional approach, which looks to "the nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the actor who performed it." Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2613 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 229 (1988)); Burns, 500 U.S. at 486.
48. Roy R. Brandys, Note, Constitutional Law-Section 1983 Liability-Absoluie Immunity for
Police Witnesses-Briscoe v. LaHue, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1105, 1108-09 (1983). In the
United States, the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution grants absolute immunity to both
Houses of Congress with respect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or action which takes place
while in session. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
512 (1972) (holding that the Speech and Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into both those things said
or done in the House or Senate in the performance of official duties, and the motivation for such
acts). This legislative immunity is based on the public policy that the interests of society can best
be served by allowing members of the legislature to perform their duties independently and
effectively without fear of civil or criminal prosecution. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
49. Brandys, supra note 48, at 1109. At common law, the executive officers of both the nation
and the states were granted absolute immunity for defamatory statements made while discharging
their official duties. Id. This grant of immunity ensures policymaking officials the freedom
necessary to exercise their official duties without fear of civil liability. 1 FoWLER V. HARPER &
FLEMINO JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.23, at 429 (1956). "Mhe President of the United
States and the governors of the various states and territories come within the rule, as do the members
of the President's cabinet and heads of agencies and comparable state officers." Id.
50. Brandys, supra note 48, at 1108-09. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
51. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Judicial immunity has its roots in the early English common law. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1305, 1307 (K.B. 1607) ('And as a Judge shall not be drawn in question in the cases aforesaid,
at the suit of the parties, no more shall he be charged in the said cases before any other Judge at the
suit of the King."). In England, by 1608, it was well settled that a judge could be made to answer
to no one save the king. Id.; see Comment, Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel for
Malpractice in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 57 IowA L. REv. 1420, 1422 (1972) [hereinafter
Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel]. Absolute judicial immunity secures complete and
independent decision-making, and such immunity exists not for the protection or benefit of judges,
but rather for the benefit of the public through the effective administration of justice. Van Vechten
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 469-70
(1909).
52. Brandys, supra note 48, at 1112; see, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th
Cir. 1973) (extending immunity to a state's attorney), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.) (extending immunity to an attorney general), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Smith v. Parman, 165 P. 663 (Kan. 1917) (extending immunity to a
city attorney).
Like judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity is as old as the English common law. See
Anfield v. Feverhiil, 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B. 1614); Hodgsonv. Scarlett, 106 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B.
1818). Prosecutorial immunity was first recognized in the United States in Griffith v. Slinkard, 44
N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896) (holding that prosecutor is a judicial officer and thus is not liable in a civil
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absolute judicial immunity is justified because these officials are more likely to
be sued than others, and because safeguards inherent in the judicial system
protect any individual interest that may be infringed upon.5
Immunity for public defenders did not exist at common law because there
was no such office in existence at the time.'e Courts have restricted the class
of cases to which immunity applies because immunity diametrically opposes the
traditional rule that "for every wrong there must be a remedy. " 7 One such
remedy is a malpractice action for damages against a negligent attorney.
B. Attorney Malpractice
Legal malpractice originated from contract law, with the claim arising when
counsel was in breach of an express or implied contract with the client.'
action for malicious prosecution). The rationale for such immunity, as with judges, is that persons
so clearly associated with the judicial process should be allowed to speak and act freely in the
discharge of their official duties. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926), afj'd, 275 U.S.
503 (1927); see also 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 49, at 305 (noting that the policy requiring
immunity for a judge applies to prosecutors as well). See Brandys, supra note 48, at 1112.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a state prosecutor
was absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983 for the initiation and pursuit
of a criminal prosecution, including presentation of the state's case at trial, because the common-law
rule of immunity for prosecutors was well settled, and such conduct was "intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430-31. In Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991),
the Court held that a prosecutor was absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for appearing
at a probable cause hearing, but not for giving legal advice to the police. Id. at 490-96. The Court
reasoned that participating in a probable cause hearing accorded with common-law absolute
immunity for prosecutors for eliciting false or defamatory testimony from witnesses or for making
false or defamatory statements during and related to judicial proceedings, and such conduct was
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 489-90, 492 (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
53. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 ("The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon
the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting
within the scope of their duties."). See Carlson, supra note 12, at 139.
54. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (holding that, since common law provided
absolute immunity for all persons who were integral participants in the judicial process, a police
witness in a criminal trial must be granted absolute immunity from civil liability).
55. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). The Butz Court explained that the insulation
of judges from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the
adversarial nature of the judicial process, and the correctibility of error on appeal are examples of
checks on malicious actions by judges, while professional obligations and the nature of the adversary
system serve as checks on the wrongdoing of prosecutors. Id. The Court further explained that
jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias, and witnesses are subject to rigorous
cross-examination and the penalty of perjury. Id.
56. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984). For a discussion of the origin of public
defender systems, see infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
57. Brandys, supra note 48, at 1108.
58. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 742 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
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Early cases often held that a negligent representation action against an attorney
must "sound" in contract." Today, legal malpractice is thought to constitute
both a tort and a breach of contract, and even though legal malpractice is usually
enforced by a negligence action, the attorney's liability actually rests on the
attorney's employment by the client, which is contractual in nature.'
The current standard for determining attorney malpractice liability is the
standard of reasonableness. 6 Hence, the attorney is bound to exercise the skill
and knowledge possessed by a reasonable, prudent attorney under similar
circumstances.' In an action against an attorney for negligence, the client has
the burden of proving four elements: first, that an attorney-client relationship
existed, creating a duty of care upon the attorney; second, that the attorney
committed acts or omissions in breach of that duty; third, that the attorney's
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury; and fourth, that an injury
did in fact occur.' The third and fourth elements, the so-called "case within
a case requirement," involve a showing that "but for" the attorney's negligence,
the client would have been successful in the underlying case."
Though malpractice claims against criminal defense attorneys were once
practically unknown, criminal defense attorneys are now as likely or more likely
than other attorneys to be sued for malpractice.' This is due to the nature of
59. Id. at 742-43 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (citing Goodman& Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482
(1857)).
60. 7A C.J.S. Auomey & Client § 255 (1980). Hence, for the attorney to be held liable for
malpractice, it must appear that the alleged loss arose from the attorney's neglect to discharge a duty
that was fairly within the purview of the attorney's employment. Id.
61. RFSTATMAMENT (SE-OND) OF TORTS § 299 (1989) ("An act may be negligent if it is done
without the competence which a reasonable man in the position of the actor would recognize as
necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.").
62. Id.; Mallen, supra note 17, at 60. An attorney is generally not liable to the client for a bad
result, or even for an error in judgment, unless such result or judgment is the product of professional
negligence. Mallen, supra note 17, at 60. In The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Relecdons on
"Ciminal Malpractice," authors Otto M. Kaus and Ronald E. Mallen further explain:
A lawyer is not a guarantor of a result nor does he insure the soundness of his opinions
or strategies. He is not liable for every mistake he makes, nor need he be a seer who
anticipates points of law in decisions not yet rendered; but he is liable for damages when
he is negligent.
Otto M. Kaus & Ronald E. Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal
Malpractice," 21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1213 (1974).
63. See 7A C.J.S. Atomey & C/ient § 255 (1980).
64. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.4, at 722-23; see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397,
401 (4th Cir. 1916).
65. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.1, at 718. The courts have reached different results in particular
instances on whether a defense attorney's handling of a criminal case constituted actionable legal
malpractice. For a discussion of particular acts or omissions of criminal defense attorneys which
have been held to constitute legal malpractice, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Legal Malpractice
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the interests that criminal defense attorneys litigatese and the fact that clients
who are convicted in criminal cases usually have nothing to lose and much to
gain by suing their attorneys.' As in attorney negligence cases in general,
attorneys in criminal defense negligence cases are held to a duty of reasonable
care and must exercise ordinary skill, knowledge, and diligence.' However,
with respect to the causation analysis, some courts have held that, in criminal
defense attorney malpractice, the plaintiff must prove his or her actual innocence
to recover.' Moreover, courts more frequently have held criminal defense
attorneys to the standard of attorneys regularly engaged in the practice of
criminal law.' Thus, a higher standard of care applies to attorneys holding
themselves out as specialists." The public defender is such a specialist.
C. Public Defender Systems
Public defender systems have only recently developed on a large scale. 2
in Defense of Criminal Prosecution, 4 A.L.R. 5TH 273 (1992).
66. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.1, at 718. Hall notes that due to the nature of the criminal
justice system, criminal lawyers are more likely than non-criminal lawyers to have to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client to prevail. Id. § 27.3, at 721.
67. Id. § 27.1, at 718.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 (1989); see supra note 61.
69. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.5, at 723 (citations omitted). Kaus & Mallen ask,
What would be the result of a public opinion poll which asks this question: "Should a
lawyer have to pay damages to a guilty client because he negligently fails to secure an
acquittal?" Surely avery substantial percentage of those polled would say that the guilty
client is not entitled to damages since-God works in mysterious ways-justice" was
done. Would the public really tolerate the thought of a prisoner, who is precisely where
he ought to be, receiving substantial damages for not being on the street planning to rob
another bank?
Kaus & Mallen, supra note 62, at 1203. Actual innocence may not necessarily guarantee success
in a malpractice action. See Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934) (holding that even though
actual innocence was proven, plaintiff could not recover because negligence was not proven). For
an argument against the use of the actual innocence requirement in criminal malpractice cases, see
Susan M. Treyz, Note, Criminal Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 719 (1991).
70. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.3, at 721 (citations omitted). For a thorough discussion of the
obstacles faced by criminal malpractice plaintiffs, see David H. Potel, Comment, Criminal
Malpractice: Threshold Barriers to Recovery Against Negligent Criminal Counsel, 1981 DUKE L.
J. 542 (1981).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 299A (1989) ("Unless he represents that he has
greater or less skill and knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.").
72. Though the first defender program in the United States was established in 1914 in Los
Angeles, California, as recently as 1961 defender services existed in only three percent of the
nation's counties. Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 476 (1982). For a general discussion of
indigent criminal defense systems and their history, see LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR
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The prior scarcity of defender services was related to the fact that before the
1963 Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainwright,' the sixth amendment
right to counsel had not been applied to the states. 74 Thus, because most
criminal prosecutions take place at the state level, there was effectively no
requirement that counsel be provided to indigent criminal defendants.75
Consequently, the demand for appointed counsel was fairly small and was
usually satisfied through the case-by-case appointment of members of the local
bar. 76 Originally, assigned counsel received no compensation for their work,
but because such practice was perceived as unfair to both the attorneys and the
indigent defendants,' appointed counsel later received compensation.'
However, even after appointed counsel were paid, problems with the appointed
counsel system persisted." The compensation was low and thus did not assure
the client adequate representation.s' Moreover, the judge's power of
IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965), and REGINALD H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND
THE POOR (Arno Press 1971) (1919).
73. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel is fundamental and
binding on the states). See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Gideon and
subsequent cases expanding the right to counsel).
74. While the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938), held that the
Sixth Amendment required that counsel be appointed for those unable to retain counsel, Johnson was
limited to federal prosecutions because at the time the Sixth Amendment had not been applied to the
states. Mounts, supra note 72, at 476. In fact, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942),
the Court explicitly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not incorporate
the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Bers was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
75. Mounts, supra note 72, at 477. Mounts notes the following: "Because the vast majority
of criminal prosecutions take place in the state courts, and because the cases in which the courts
found it necessary to appoint counsel were few and far between, the actual number of attorneys
needed to handle these cases was relatively small." Id.
76. Id. at 478.
77. Among the problems with the unpaid appointed counsel system were that, because it is
generally thought that problems in the criminal justice system should be borne by society as a whole,
it was unfair to place the entire financial burden of providing counsel on the local bar. Mounts,
supra note 72, at 479. Further, requiring appointed counsel to provide services for free, in addition
to paying out-of-pocket expenses, had an adverse effect on the quality of representation. Id. See
infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Criminal Justice Act of 1964).
Additionally, in The Public Defender: A Necessary Factor in the Administrion of Justice,
author Mayer C. Goldman argued that, just as merchants cannot be forced to donate portions of their
stock to the needy, attorneys should not be required to provide services gratuitously. MAYER C.
GOLDMAN, THE PUBIUC DEFENDER: A NECESSARY FACTOR IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
18 (Arno Press 1974) (1917). Goldman also asserted that an accused should not be dependant upon
the services of counsel working without compensation. Id. at 17-18.
78. Mounts, supra note 72, at 479.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834, 841 (E.D.N.Y), rev'd on other grounds, 481
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
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appointment became a source of patronage.8' Further, attorneys most willing
to take criminal appointments were attorneys who were just beginning their
practice, and "professional" appointed counsel who, to maximize their profits,
would accept large numbers of cases and dispose of them as quickly as
possible.' Not surprisingly, both of these groups usually provided inadequate
representation.8
However, in Gideon v. Wainwright,s" the United States Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was fundamental and thus binding
on the states.' The effect of Gideon and subsequent casess" was to expand
the right to counsel, both at trial and at other stages of the proceedings." This
led to an increased demand for criminal defense attorneys.' Many
jurisdictions responded to this increased demand by establishing public defender
offices." In contrast to the assigned counsel system, a defender system
provides indigent defense services by salaried lawyers who devote all of their
practice to indigent criminal defense.'
Because most public defender programs are organized at the county level,
81. Mounts, supra note 72, at 479-80; see David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1973) ("To the extent the quality of justice depends on an
incestuous relationship between judges and attorneys, the adversary quality of the system is
corrupted.").
82. Mounts, supra note 72, at 479. Bazelon notes that though the high-volume "regulars" were
relatively few, they were assigned a percentage of cases far out of proportion to their numbers.
Bazelon, supra note 81, at 10.
83. Mounts, supra note 72, at 479. The assigned counsel system is still used in many
jurisdictions, though it is generally confined to rural areas. Id. at 478 n.22.
84. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
85. Id. at 344-45 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
86. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding that an accused is
entitled to have counsel provided in certain parole and probation revocation hearings); Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (holding that an accused has a right to have counsel present at
a preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (holding that an
accused has a right to have counsel present at a pre-trial line-up); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964) (holding that an accused has a right to be aided by counsel when subjected
to police interrogation); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that counsel
must be appointed for the first level of appeal).
87. Mounts, supra note 72, at 478.
88. Id. ("Mhe combined effect, in terms of legal personnel required to fulfill the promise made
in these decisions, is enormous. This increase in the demand for criminal defense attorneys has had
substantial impact on the systems used to provide defense services.").
89. Id. at 481. In 1961, two years before Gideon, defender systems existed in a mere three
percent of the nation's counties, and those defender systems served approximately one-quarter of the
population. In contrast, by 1973, defender systems existed in 28 percent of the nation's counties
and served nearly two-thirds of the population. Id. at 481 n.40.
90. Id. at 478 n.22. For a comparison of assigned counsel and defender systems, see
SILVIRSTEIN, supra note 72, at 15-74.
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defender programs are generally considered part of the county government. 9'
Thus the defender program must apply to the county each year for its budget.'2
However, because virtually all of the defenders' clients are charged with often
heinous crimes, the tasks of public defenders are notoriously unpopular.
93
Consequently, local politicians, in tune with the sentiments of their constituents,
often have little to gain by giving public defender offices large budgetary
appropriations.' As a result, most modem public defender offices are severely
under-funded.Y Limited budgets, in turn, lead to staff shortages, which have
ultimately resulted in excessive caseloads in public defender offices across the
country." The under-funding and excessive caseloads characteristic of most
modem public defender offices are critical factors in determining whether public
defenders should be subject to malpractice liability. The next section discusses
the treatment, by both state courts and the United States Supreme Court, of
public defenders regarding malpractice liability.
H. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DEFENDER MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
The first state court decision to address the issue of public defender
malpractice liability was the 1975 Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Spring
v. Constantino." In a carefully reasoned opinion," the court held that none
of the immunities advanced by the state extended to public defenders." The
court rejected the argument that a public defender is appointed by the judiciary
to a judicial office and, like a prosecutor, performs an integral part of the
91. Mounts, supra note 72, at 482.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 481-82. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) ("The
duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations.").
94. Mounts, supra note 72, at 482.
95. Id. at 482-83; see NLADA REPORT, supra note 11. For a further discussion of the under-
funding of public defender offices, see infra text accompanying note 190.
96. Mounts, supra note 72, at 483; see NLADA REPORT, supra note 11. For a further
discussion of the excessive caseloads in public defender offices, see infra notes 186-89 and.
accompanying text.
97. 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975). In Spring, the plaintiffclient alleged that her public defender
negligently disclosed to the court the defender's belief that the client was insane. Id. at 873. The
attorney general, on behalf of the defender, alleged immunity from suit. Id. The trial court
sustained the plea and dismissed the plaintiff's case. Id.
98. Mallen, supra note 17, at 65.
99. Spring, 362 A.2d at 879. The state advanced three grounds for the public defender's
immunity: judicial immunity, common law sovereign immunity, and statutory immunity of state
employees. Id. at 873.
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judicial process."le Rather, the court found that while a prosecutor represents
the state and is under a duty to see that impartial justice is done, a public
defender, upon assignment, represents his or her client.' *' The court empha-
sized that the public defender's role is that of an advocate, whose role does not
differ from that of a privately retained attorney.'02 The court reasoned that
an attorney's allegiance is to the client, not to the entity that happens to be
paying the defender's salary."m The court concluded that the public defen-
der's independence and freedom from state entanglement is a constitutional
underpinning of Connecticut's public defender system."°
The next significant case dealing with public defender malpractice immunity
was Reese v. Danforth."t Like the Connecticut Supreme Court in Spring, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Reese held that the public defender was not a
100. Id. at 874. The court reasoned that this argument swept too broadly and encompassed any
privately retained attorney who represents a criminal defendant. Id. The court further reasoned that
all attorneys who undertake criminal cases perform an integral part of the judicial process, namely
the defense of the accused and protection of the innocent. Id.
101. Id. at 874-75. The court also rejected the defender's sovereign immunity argument on this
basis, reasoning that the conduct of a public defender is not a sovereign or governmental act. Id.
at 875.
102. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 874-75 (Conn. 1975).
103. Id. at 878. In rejecting the defender's claim of statutory immunity as a state employee,
the court reasoned that although the defender's employment and source of compensation differs from
that of privately retained counsel, the status of a public defender, once the attorney-client relationship
attaches, is that of an independent contractor. Id. at 877-78. See infra note 160.
104. Id. at 878; see nfra text accompanying notes 167-70 (arguing that the public defender's
independence is mandated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). The court also noted
that the public defender's principled and fearless defense of the client would not be deterred by the
possibility of malpractice liability. Id. at 874-75.
The next court to address the issue of public defender malpractice immunity, the New York
Supreme Court, reached a different result than the Spring court. In Scott v. City of Niagara Falls,
407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), the court held that public defenders are immune from
malpractice liability for discretionary acts or decisions made in pursuit of their official duties. Id.
at 106. The court reasoned that the public defender, like the judge and prosecutor, is a public
official who receives compensation from the county and whose responsibility is to insure that justice
is achieved in the context of our adversary system. Id. at 105. The court relied on the public
defender's lack of choice in handling frivolous matters, as well as the public defender's large
caseloads. Id. The court speculated that the possibility of frivolous claims may make it difficult to
recruit capable public defenders. Id. Finally, the court maintained that indigent defendants remain
free to pursue other post-conviction relief, while careless public defenders may face bar association
discipline. Id. Much of the Scott court's reasoning is echoed in Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771
(Minn. 1993). See infia notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discitrasing Dziubak).
105. 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979). In Reese, the plaintiff client alleged that he was involuntarily
confined as a result of his public defender's negligent representation. Id. at 737. The trial court
found that the public defender was a public official and thus was entitled to immunity from liability
for negligent conduct. Id. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court. Id.
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public official entitled to immunity." Rather, the duty of zealous represen-
tation of a client's interests attaches to the public defender just as it does to
private counsel, and the performance of this duty by a public defender is similar
to the performance of that duty by private counsel."07 Echoing the Spring
court, the Reese court reasoned that once a public defender is appointed to a
case, the defender's public function ceases and, thereafter, the defender's
professional relationship with the client takes on all the obligations and
protections present in a private attorney-client relationship, except that the public
pays the defender's fee."
The court also rejected the public policy arguments that public defender
malpractice liability would hinder both the recruitment of public defenders and
the unfettered exercise of discretion." The court opined:
Whether a particular individual claiming official status is accorded
immunity depends upon "the nature of his duties, the importance of
his office, and particularly whether or not he has policy-making
functions." [Immunity] does not turn on the putative effect of the
imposition of the financial burdens attendant to tort liability."0
Finally, the court reasoned that, because granting immunity would in effect deny
indigents tort relief that would be available to paying clients, immunity would
raise troublesome equal protection problems."'
106. Id. at 740. The court began its analysis by noting that under Pennsylvania law, public
officials are entitled to "some" form of immunity, while mere public employees having no policy-
making functions are entitled to no immunity. Id. at 737. Hence, the critical issue to the court was
whether a public defender is a public official entitled to some sort of immunity, or a mere public
employee to whom no immunity flows. Id.
107. Id. at 738. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBuLrY Canon 7 (1981)
(requiring that an attorney zealously represent his or her client within the bounds of the law); see
supra note 93. Like the Spring court, the Reese court compared the relationship between the county
and the public defender to that between an independent contractor and the party contracting for his
or her services. Reese, 406 A.2d at 738. The court reasoned that the county has no control over
the manner of representation given to indigent defendants. Id. The court further reasoned that the
nature of the defender's work involves the attorney-client relationship, which precludes outside
interference or direction by the county. Id. See fra note 160.
108. Id. at 739.
109. Id. at 739-40; see supra note 104 (discussing the reasoning of the New York Supreme
Court in Scott v. City of Niagara Fals, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)).
110. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739-740 (Pa. 1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 740 (citing Liability of Court Appointed Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1425-
27). The court reasoned that a finding of immunity would be tantamount to distinguishing between
groups of plaintiffs based on their economic status. Id. See also id. at 741 (Roberts, J., concurring)
("Immunity would only permit less zealous representation and deny to those who cannot afford
private counsel an equal remedy for their injuries.").
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In an oft-cited dissent,"' Justice O'Brien argued that immunity would not
pose equal protection problems because "the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."" 3  Justice O'Brien
also argued that the attorney malpractice cause of action originated from contract
law, and a public defender, unlike a private attorney, is not free to contract with
clients."" This unique relationship between the public defender and client
justifies treating public defenders differently from privately retained counsel."15
However, noting that a grant of immunity must rest on weightier policy
considerations," 6 Justice O'Brien maintained that immunity is required by the
need to both recruit public defenders and encourage their full exercise of
unfettered discretion. 117
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of
public defender immunity."' In Ferri v. Ackerman,"' a unanimous
Supreme Court held that federal law does not grant immunity from a state
112. See Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949,951 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991).
113. Reese, 406 A.2d at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Seh. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)). However, Justice O'Brien conceded that "if public defenders
are immune from civil liability, a cause of action available to persons sufficiently affluent to secure
private representation will be foreclosed to persons not so happily circumstanced." Id. at 742
(O'Brien, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 742-43 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). Justice O'Brien found the evolution of English
thought on this issue persuasive. Id. at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). See infra notes 174-78 and
accompanying text.
115. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 742 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
116. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
117. Reese, 406 A.2d at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (citing Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899,901
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1976)). The Minns court explained:
Basically there are two [policy reasons justifying a rule of absolute immunity]: (a) the
need to recruit and hold able lawyers to represent indigents both full and part-tim
public defenders, as well as private practitioners appointed by courts to represent
individual defendants or litigants, and (b) the need to encourage counsel in the full
exercise of professionalism, i.e., the unfettered discretion, in the light of their training
and experience, to decline to press the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent
litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a single litigant as to how best
his interests may be advanced.
Minns, 542 F.2d at 901.
118. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
119. 444 U.S. 193 (1979). In Ferr, after being convicted in federal court, the plaintiff sued
his court-appointed attorney in Pennsylvania state court, alleging that the attorney was negligent in
numerous instances, including failure to raise the statute of limitations defense. Id. at 194-96. The
Court of Common Pleas dismissed the complaint on the ground that the court-appointed counsel
should be immune from civil liability. Id. at 196. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
order of dismissal. Id. at 196-97; see Ferri v. Ackerman, 394 A.2d 553 (Pa. 1978).
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malpractice action to an attorney appointed by a federal court.' 2  Though
declining to express an opinion on immunity under state law,' 2' the Court
reasoned that the only applicable statute, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,"2
attempted to minimize the differences between retained and appointed
counsel." 2 This indicated that Congress intended that court-appointed counsel
should be subject to the same liabilities as privately retained attorneys.' 2 The
Court also reasoned that even though federal funds provided the source of the
attorney's compensation, that is an inadequate basis for inferring that Congress
intended to grant the attorney immunity from malpractice liability."2
The Court then compared court-appointed attorneys to other state-appointed
judicial officers, such as judges, prosecutors, and grand jurors. The Court
found that prosecutors, judges, and grand jurors represent the interests of society
as a whole, and because their conduct may affect a wide variety of people,
immunity for them is justified, even in the absence of a statutory grant.12 In
contrast, the duties of court-appointed counsel parallel those of privately retained
counsel.'" The court-appointed counsel's principal duty is to serve the
interests of the client, and an indispensable element of such counsel's effective
120. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J.). For a thorough critique of the Ferri decision, see
Lack of Immunity of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys in Criminal Cases, 24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
141 (1980).
121. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 197-98. The Court explained:
We are not concerned with the elements of a state cause of action for malpractice..
. Nor are we concerned with the question whether Pennsylvania may conclude as a
matter of state law that [the attorney) is absolutely immune. For when state law creates
a cause of action, the State is free to define the defenses to that claim, including the
defense of immunity, unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with federal law.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, c!. 2).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
123. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 199. In response to evidence that unpaid appointed counsel were
sometimes less difigent that retained counsel, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act to provide
compensation for attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants in federal criminal trials. Id.
As noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 'It seems obvious that the Congressional purpose
in adopting [the Criminal Justice Act) was to seek to place indigent defendants as nearly as may be
on a level of equality with nonindigent defendants in the defense of criminal cases." United States
v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
124. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1979).
125. Id. at 201. The Court observed that countless private citizens receive federal funds of one
kind or another, but Congress assuredly did not intend for all recipients of federal funds to be
immune for actions taken in spending those funds. Id.
126. Id. at 202-03. The Court characterized such immunity as an incident of the particular
office. Id.
127. Id. at 204. Earlier in the opinion, the Court cited Justice Burger's statement that the
"defense counsel who is appointed by the court ... has exactly the same duties and burdens and
responsibilities as the highly paid, paid-in-advance criminal defense lawyer." Id. at 200-01 n. 17
(citing Warren E. Burger, Counsel for the Prosecudon and Defense-Their Roles Under &he
Minimun Standards, 8 AM. CalM. L.Q. 2, 6 (1969)).
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performance is the ability to act independently of the government.'" Further,
the Court reasoned that the fear of a malpractice claim, rather than conflicting
with court-appointed counsels' performance of their functions, provides the same
incentive for appointed and retained counsel to perform their functions
effectively.' 2
Prior to the seminal Ferri and Reese cases, most suits by indigent
defendants against their government-appointed attorneys alleged a violation of
the sixth amendment right to counsel.'" Such suits were brought either as
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment,' 3 ' or
as damages claims alleging a violation of section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act. The latter avenue of relief was foreclosed to indigent criminal
defendants by the Supreme Court in Polk County v. Dodson.133  In Polk
County, the Court held that public defenders do not act "under color of" state
law when providing the traditional functions of representation to a criminal
128. Id. at 204.
129. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979). The Court noted that there was no claim
that retained counsel are immune from malpractice liability by virtue of their participation in federal
criminal trials. Id. at 204 n.21.
The Court did acknowledge that policy reasons may exist that could justify a grant of
immunity. Id. at 204-05. The Court noted that the most persuasive reason justifying a grant of
immunity is the recruitment of competent counsel to accept indigent defense work. Id. However,
the Court noted that the attorney did not direct the Court to empirical data to support his argument
that the risk of malpractice litigation either adversely affects the quality of representation, or deters
members of the private bar from representing indigent defendants. Id. at 201 n.17. Thus, given
the speculative nature of the attorney's argument, the Court refused to ascribe to Congress an intent
to grant immunity, but noted that the question is best left to a legislative body acting on the basis
of empirical data. Id. at 201 n.17, 205.
130. Carlson, supra note 12, at 136. See supra note 14 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
131. Carlson, supra note 12, at 136. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),
the Supreme Court established a two prong requirement for reversal of a conviction or setting aside
of a death sentence based on a sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance. First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 687. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. The Court refused to delineate specific
guidelines for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, save to say that the inquiry is
whether counsel's assistance was reasonableunder the circumstances. Id. at 687-88. The Court also
noted that the inquiry is highly deferential. Id. at 689. For a discussion of the relationship between
ineffective assistance of counsel and malpractice, see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
132. Carlson, supra note 12, at 136-37. See supra note 17 for the text of section 1983.
133. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the plaintiff prisoner brought suit in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) against Polk County, its Offender Advocate, its Board of
Supervisors, and an attorney in the Offender Advocate's Office. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 312.
The plaintiff alleged that his civil rights were violated when the attorney moved to withdraw as
counsel on the grounds that the plaintiff's claims were frivolous. Id. The district court dismissed
the plaintiff's claims, holding that the attorney's actions were not 'under color of state law. Id.
at 315; see Dodson v. Polk County, 483 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. Iowa 1979). However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Polk Cowuy, 454 U.S. at 316; see Dodson
v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1980).
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defendant. '3
Though Polk County dealt with a public defender's liability under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the Court's reasoning is nevertheless instructive
with regard to public defender malpractice liability. The Court reasoned that,
except for the source of payment, the relationship between the public defender
and the client is identical to that existing between any other lawyer and
client." The Court emphasized the independence of the public defender,
noting that implicit in the "guiding hand" of counsel guaranteed to criminal
defendants under Gideon v. Wainwright * is the supposition that appointed
counsel will be free from state control.1
37
Since the foundational Spring, Reese, Ferni, and Polk County cases, state
134. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321 (Powell, J.). Significantly, the Polt County Court, like the
Ferri Court, noted: "[W]e intimate no views as to a public defender's liability for malpractice in
an appropriate case under state tort law." Id. at 325 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 198
(1979)). See supra note 121.
Prior to Polk County, some federal circuits held that public defenders were immune under
section 1983. See Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1976); John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973); Brown
v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Sullens v. Carroll, 446
F.2d 1392 (5th Cit. 1971); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966). However, because the
Polk County Court held that public defenders do not act "under color of" state law, the Court did
not find it necessary to reach the immunity issue. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 317 n.4.
135. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318.
136. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See supra notes 84-85 and accompanyingtext (discussing Gideon).
137. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345). But see Kenneth S.
Schlessinger, Note, Polk County v. Dodson: Liability Under Section 1983for a Public Defender's
Failure to Provide Adequate Counsel, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (1982) (arguing that, because
public defenders are independent advocates, they perform their duties with unlimited discretion,
which leads to more deprivations of indigent defendants' constitutional rights; consequently, a
section 1983 remedy is necessary to ensure that the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel
does not evade judicial review).
Justice Blackmun, the sole dissenter in Polk County, criticized the Court's holding as unduly
minimizing the influence that the government has over the public defender. Polk County, 454 U.S.
at 331-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In contrast to other courts addressing the issue, Justice
Blackmun argued that, while the authority of a privately retained attorney is derived from the client's
selection of the lawyer, a public defender's power is possessed by virtue of the state's selection of
the attorney and the attorney's official employment. Id. at 329 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The
public defender is not merely paid by the county; he is totally dependant financially on the County
Board of Supervisors, which fixes the compensation for the public defender and his staff and
provides the office with equipment and supplies." Id. at 332 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Three years after Polk County, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Polk County
Court's holding that public defenders do not act "under color of" state law when performing their
normal functions. In Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984), the Court held that state public
defenders are not immune from liability under section 1983 for intentional misconduct, "under color
of" state law, involving alleged conspiratorial action that deprives their clients of constitutional
rights. Id.
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courts have largely split on the issue of public defender malpractice
immunity.' The most recent court to address the issue was the Minnesota
Supreme Court, in Dziubak v. Mot.'39  In Dziubak, the court held that
important social values require that public defenders be immune from suit for
legal malpractice." The Dziubak court perceived the judge, district attorney,
and public defender as part of a courtroom triumvirate, with the public defender
serving as an adversary to the prosecutor, "not an adversary of the system but
an integral part of it." 4 The court also likened the public defender to a
138. See Shaw v. State Dept. of Admin., 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993) (allowing malpractice
suit against public defender office); Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that public defenders are liable for malpractice whether considered independent contractors
or public employees, but since public defenders are public employees within the meaning of state
tort claims act, client suing public defender for malpractice must sue county); Pearson v. Sublette,
730 P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing malpractice suit against public defender); Browne
v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990) (applying the Reese dissent and finding defendant court-
appointed counsel immune from malpractice liability under state tort claims act), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 952 (1991); Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that public
defender is an advocate whose role is no different than that of a private attorney); White v. Galvin,
524 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (following Polk County and holding that public defender was
not an employee under state tort claims act and thus county need not be given notice as required by
tort claims act); Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Ferri as a strong
indication of a trend away from immunity); Laws v. Hager, 693 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing malpractice suit against public defender); Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343 (Nev. 1989)
(holding that satute conferring immunity for discretionary acts includes public defender in its
definition of 'public officer"); Delbridge v. Office of Pub. Defender, 569 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989) (holding that public defenders are immune from malpractice liability); Herrera
v. Sedillo, 740 P.2d 1190 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that immunity granted to attorneys
appointed under the Indigent Defense Act applies also to those acting under authority of the Public
Defender Act); DeBrosse v. Jamison, No. 91-CA-26, 1992 WL 5851 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1992)
(allowing malpractice suit against public defender); Veneri v. Papano, 622 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (following Reese and finding public defender not immune from malpractice liability); Williams
v. Office of Pub. Defender, 586 A.2d 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (following Reese and finding public
defender not immune).
139. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993). In Dziubak, plaintiff Dziubak plead guilty to one count
of second-degree manslaughter. Dziubak's conviction was later vacated when it was discovered that
Dziubak's defense expert misread a toxicology report that indicated fatal levels of anti-depressants
in the decedent's blood. Id. at 773 n.2. Dziubak then sued his public defenders for malpractice.
Id. at 773. The defenders moved for a dismissal based upon immunity from suit. Id. The trial
court denied the motion, but held that Dziubak was collaterally estopped from litigating whether the
public defenders negligently failed to discover the fatal levels of anti-depressants. Id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.; see Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
140. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 773. The court noted that tort immunity is generally based on
the idea that, though a defendant might be negligent, important social values require that the
defendant remain free from liability. Id. at 774 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984)). See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the origin and current state of immunities law).
141. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Stephen L. Millich, Public Defender Malpractice
Liability in California, 11 WHrrTER L. Rav. 535, 537-38 (1989)).
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guardian ad litem, reasoning that both are appointed to protect the best interests
of their clients and that both must be free to exercise independent judgment
without having to weigh potential civil liability into their decisions."c
The court reasoned that while this argument also encompasses privately
retained attorneys, significant differences exist between private counsel and
public defenders.'" The court emphasized the crisis conditions present in
most public defender offices. 4  Public defenders generally work with
excessive caseloads, and most public defender offices are grossly under-
funded.'" Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that state indemnity of public
defenders solves the immunity issue, the court alleged that the substantial time,
money, and energy consumed in defending malpractice suits would further drain
public defenders' already sparse resources."T 6 The court concluded that the
extension of immunity to public defenders would ensure that the resources
available to the public defender will be used for the defense of the accused,
rather than diminished tough the defemse of malpractice suits against public defders4
142. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775. The court explained that it recently held a guardian ad
litem, who is appointed by the court to protect the best interests of a child in a proceeding involving
the child, absolutely immune from negligence claims arising out of conduct within the scope of the
guardian's duties. Id. (citing T'indell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988)). The court
noted that a guardian must be free to engage in vigorous representation of the child, and immunity
is necessary to avoid harassment from disgruntled parents. Id.
143. Id.
144. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Minn. 1993). The court drew heavily from
THE SPANGENBERo GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA BOARD
OF PUBuC DEFENSE (1991).
145. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775-76. The court noted that public defenders work substantially
above capacity, with insufficient time to devote to their cases. Id. at 775. Further, the crime rate
continues to increase, and the economic climate has resulted in increased claims of indigency and
lower state budgets; thus public defender caseloads continue to grow. Id. at 776. The court
concluded: "It would be an unfair burden to subject the public defender to possible malpractice for
acts or omissions due to impossible caseloads and an under-funded office: something completely out
of the defender's control." Id. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the caseload and funding problems faced by public defender offices. See infra notes
193-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causes of the caseload and funding problems.
146. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776-77. In rejecting the plaintiff's indemnity argument, the court
also reasoned that potential civil liability, for a lack of resources not within the defender's control,
would deter the recruitment and maintenance of able public defenders. Id.
147. Id. at 777. The court also noted that indigent defendants have other remedies through the
appeals process and post-conviction relief. Id. at 776.
In a forceful dissent, Justice Gardebring argued that the majority opinion reflected a lack of
confidence in public defenders, when in reality public defenders are highly experienced professionals
who provide the best possible defense under the circumstances. Id. at 778 (Gardebring, J.,
dissenting). Justice Gardebring further argued that the ineffective assistance remedy cannot fully
right the wrong done to someone who may have been unjustly incarcerated; rather, a civil remedy
is needed. Id. (Gardebring, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Gardebring argued that the absence
of immunity would not result in an onslaught of malpractice suits. Public defenders do an admirable
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Both the United States Supreme Court and various state courts have
grappled with the issue of public defender malpractice liability. However, the
courts have reached different results using a wide array of rationales. A detailed
analysis of the rationales advanced both in favor of and against public defender
malpractice immunity is thus necessary to understand the need for model
legislation in this area.
IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
IMMUNIrY RATIONALES
Public defenders should not be immune from malpractice liability. A public
defender's duties and obligations are akin to those of a private attorney, who is
of course subject to malpractice liability."4 Moreover, the public defender's
inability to choose clients exists independently of the duty to act with reasonable
care, and ethical considerations impose limits on the permissible advocacy of all
attorneys. 49 Also, it is unfair to make indigent defendants pay for the
problems of public defenders' under-funding and excessive caseloads.'" A
rule of malpractice liability would deter neither fearless advocacy nor public
defender recruitment.'' In addition, due to the difficult burden of proof in
a malpractice action, and the resulting necessity of counsel in such suits,
malpractice liability would not cause the floodgates to be opened to frivolous
suits by indigents.5 2 Further, the availability of other alternatives, such as
ineffective assistance of counsel, cannot substitute for a civil remedy where the
indigent is wrongly convicted and incarcerated."in Moreover, granting
malpractice immunity to public defenders would violate the Equal Protection
Clause by unfairly distinguishing between groups of plaintiffs based solely upon
their economic status. "4
job under the circumstances, and indigent defendants, due to their indigence, will find it difficult to
retain counsel to represent them in a malpractice suit. Id. (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Gardebring reasoned that immunity is not necessary to recruit public defenders.
There is no shortage of private attorneys willing to represent indigent defendants, and indemnity
likely to be provided by the state for malpractice awards both removes the possibility of deterrence
and ensures that public defenders will vigorously pursue their cases. Id. (Gardebring, I.,
dissenting). "By this opinion the majority denies to poor criminal defendants a civil remedy for the
failure of their counsel to provide them an adequate defense," Justice Gardebring concluded. "This
action creates de facto just the kind of two-tier criminal justice system the Supreme Court hoped to
obliterate in its landmark decision, [Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)]." Id.
(Gardebring, J., dissenting).
148. See infra section IV.A, notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
149. See infra section IV.B, notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
150. See infra section IV.C, notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
151. See infra sections IV.D and IV.E, notes 199-2 15 and accompanying text.
152. See infra section IV.F, notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
153. See infra section IV.G, notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
154. See infra section IV.H, notes 238-63 and accompanying text.
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Despite the soundness of these arguments favoring public defender
malpractice liability, some courts have nevertheless extended malpractice
immunity to public defenders. The following analysis will document and
criticize the reasons why courts have granted malpractice immunity to public
defenders, and the analysis will conclude that public defenders should indeed be
subject to malpractice liability. However, due to the unique characteristics of
public defender offices, a balance should be struck between these unique
characteristics and the indigent defendant's right to recover damages for
malpractice.
A. The Public Defender As an Independent Advocate
A public office is the right, authority, and duty, conferred by law, by which
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public."5 Courts extending
immunity to public defenders have theorized that public defenders, like
prosecutors and other judicial officers, are employed and paid by the state, and
they perform the function of impartially administering criminal justice.'57
These courts conclude that there is no valid reason for extending immunity to
prosecutors and judges while withholding it from state-subsidized defenders."
However, several arguments militate against this view. First, the United
States Supreme Court, in both Ferri and Polk County, has stated that the role of
the public defender parallels that of a private attorney, rather than that of a
prosecutor or a judge. The Polk County Court held that the public
defender's appointment entails functions, duties, and responsibilities that in no
155. See infra section V, notes 264-92 and accompanying text.
156. State ex. rel. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gaertner, 619 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
See 67 C.J.S. Officers § 8 (1978); 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 12 (1984).
In general, official or unofficial character is determined by the nature of the duty, function or service
to be performed, and the power granted or wielded. 67 CJ.S. Officers § 8 (1978). There are
numerous criteria used in determining whether a person is an officer, among them official
designation, source of compensation, mode of selection, and the taking of an oath or bond. Id. No
single criteria is conclusive, and it is not necessary that all of the criteria be present for a person to
be considered an officer. Id.
157. Dziubakv. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407
N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
158. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775; Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 745 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien,
J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
950 (1973)).
159. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
204 (1979).
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way depend on state authority."W Except for the source of compensation, the
public defender's relationship with the client is identical to the relationship
between any other attorney and client."" Moreover, the Ferri Court noted
that compensation of court-appointed defenders with public funds does not
establish legislative intent that they be afforded immunity. IQ
The Supreme Court's view is echoed in the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which do not distinguish between public defenders and privately retained
counsel. " The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice' state that once an attorney undertakes to represent an accused, the
attorney's duties and obligations are the same whether the attorney is retained
160. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318. See also Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.), where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
The government hires [the public defender]... because the Sixth Amendment has been
held to require it to furnish counsel to indigent criminal defendants. One way to
discharge this constitutional duty is to hire public defenders; another is to reimburse
appointed counsel. In neither case is the government meaningfidly an employer
responsible for the care with which the lawyer does his work. In relation to the federal
government a federal defender is functionally an independent contractor rather than an
employee, and a principal is not liable for the torts of his independent contractors.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 877-78
(Conn. 1975) (reasoning that once appointed, a public defender's status is that of an independent
contractor); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 1979) (same).
161. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318. See also Klein, supra note 15, at 1187 ('[There are no
'allowances' made for the defender serving in a legal aid or defender program.").
But see Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), where the California
Court of Appeals held that salaried, full-time public defenders are public employees within the
meaning of California's Tort Claims Act, therefore the plaintiff client was required to sue the county
employing the defenders. Id. at 586. The court reasoned that while public defenders must
exclusively serve the interests of their clients, this is what the defenders were employed to do, thus
the county should be able to discipline defenders who do not meet these standards. Id. at 585. In
this respect, the court reasoned, the county does exercise control over public defenders. Id. The
court further reasoned that the county can and should exercise a degree of control to assure that its
public defenders are providing competent representation. Id.
162. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 201 ('Countless private citizens are the recipients of federal funds of
one kind or another, but Congress surely did not intend that all such recipients would be immune
for actions taken in the course of expending those funds."). See also Liability of Court-Appointed
Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1425 ('The mere fact that the court-appointed attorney is
technically a state official or employee, since he is paid by the state, is insufficient to justify granting
him immunity in the absence of any governmental interest which would be furthered by such
protection.").
163. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY Preamble and Preliminary Statement
(1981) ('[Tihe Disciplinary rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature
of their professional activities."); see Klein, supra note 15, at 1187.
164. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980), cited in Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
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or serving in a defender program."6  The Polk County Court noted that the
ABA view of a public defender's duties and responsibilities has been almost
universally accepted by courts that have considered the issue."'
Further, this freedom of public defenders from state control-as opposed
to, say, prosecutors-is part of the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed under Gideon v. Wainwright.'67 Implicit in the "guiding
hand" of counsel constitutionally guaranteed to criminal defendants under
Gideon is the assumption that counsel will be free from state control.t s In Ex
Parte Hough,t"a the California Supreme Court persuasively explained:
The public defender is free from any restraint or domination by the
district attorney or of the prosecuting authorities. He is as free to act
in behalf of his client as if he had been regularly employed and
retained by the defendant whom he represents. Were it not so his
client would not be afforded the full right 'to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense' which the Constitutions, both state and
federal, give to one accused of crime."'T
These arguments support the view that the duties, the obligations, and the role
of the public defender closely parallel those of privately retained attorneys.
Consequently, public defenders, like private attorneys, should be subject to
malpractice liability.
165. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980), cited in Polk County, 454
U.S. at 318 ("Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and
obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal
aid or defender program."). See supra note 127 (discussing Justice Burger's view of public
defenders' duties and obligations).
166. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318 n.6. See also Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362,
1364 (D. Nev. 1974) (holding that public defenders' duties are identical to those of other attorneys);
Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972) (same); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d
1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that public defender is essentially a state-paid private counsel),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Chaleff v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that public defenders are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct no less
than other members of the bar).
167. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the right
to counsel under Gideon).
168. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345). See also Ferri v.
Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) ("Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective
performance of [the defender's] responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the government
and to oppose it in adversary litigation."); Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 878 (Conn. 1975)
(noting that the public defender's freedom from state control is a constitutional underpinning of the
state's public defender system).
169. 150 P.2d 448 (Cal. 1944).
170. Id. at 452 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8). See supra note 14
for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
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B. The Public Defender's Duty to Take on Any Client Does Not Justify
Malpractice Immunity
In addition to arguing that the public defender is a public officer, courts
granting immunity have asserted that attorney malpractice was traditionally
treated as a breach of contract between the attorney and client.' However,
a public defender is not free to contract with clients, but is obligated to represent
whomever is assigned to the defender, regardless of the defender's current
workload or a case's level of difficulty.' 72 In contrast, privately retained
counsel may confer with potential clients and determine whether to accept a case
based on the case's merits, the attorney's current workload, and potential
profits. " Because public defenders are not free to contract with their clients,
the argument follows, public defenders should be immune from malpractice
liability.
This argument is an insufficient basis for granting immunity for two
reasons. First, in his dissenting opinion in Reese, Justice O'Brien found the
evolution of English thought on the inability-to-contract issue to be
persuasive.174 Justice O'Brien noted that the immunity of barristers in the
English system was generally thought to be based on the barristers' inability to
contract with their clients. 7 ' That rationale was abandoned in Rondel v.
Worsley, 76 on the ground that a professional's duty to act with reasonable care
exists independently of contractual duties; however, barristers' immunity was
retained based on public policy considerations.'" Thus, Justice O'Brien
concluded that, while the inability of public defenders to contract with clients
may justify treating public defenders differently from privately retained
171. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60 (discussing the origin of attorney malpractice).
172. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771,775 (Minn. 1993); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735,
743 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting). See also Moore v. McComsey, 459 A.2d 841, 844 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that no contractual relationship existed between client and public defender
because public defender was court-appointed).
173. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775.
174. Reese, 406 A.2d at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 743 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). In Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984), the
Supreme Court noted that the public defender has a reasonably close 'cousin" in the English
barrister.
176. 1 App. Cas. 191 (1969). The issue in Rondel was whether an action lay against a barrister
for professional negligence with respect to work done as an advocate. Id. at 193.
177. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 743 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting); Rondel, 1
App. Cas. at 203 (' lhe only rational basis for exempting barristers was thought to be the inability
to contract. But this was and is erroneous. . . . A professional man's duty to take care is a duty
irrespective of contract. . . . The sole ground that is now given for immunity is public policy.").
The Rondel court based barrister immunity on the need for barristers to fearlessly litigate their cases,
and the avoidance of retrying criminal cases under a civil standard of proof. Rondel, 1 App. Cas.
at 249, 253.
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attorneys, the inability to contract is an insufficient basis for granting
immunity.'78
Second, the inability-to-contract rationale for immunity assumes that, while
private attorneys can determine whether to accept a case based on the case's
merit, public defenders are obligated to pursue any claim, no matter how
frivolous."W In contrast, as stated by the Polk County Court, while a defense
attorney has a duty to advance all colorable claims and defenses, 11 ethical
considerations limit the permissible advocacy of all attorneys.' All
attorneys, whether retained or appointed, have a duty to avoid clogging the
courts with frivolous matters. " Therefore, the inability to contract with
clients, while possibly justifying treating public defenders differently from
privately retained counsel, should not be a basis on which to cloak public
defenders with malpractice immunity.
C. The Public Defender's Excessive Caseloads and Under-Funding Does
Not Justify Malpractice Immunity
Courts granting malpractice immunity to public defenders also claim that
such immunity is justified because public defender offices are burdened with
excessive caseloads and severely limited budgets."D As a result, public
178. Reese, 406 A.2d at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
179. See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993).
180. See supra note 93 (providing duty of attorneys under MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) to zealously represent clients within the law's boundaries).
181. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323, 323 n.14 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Commentary to 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980)), which provides:
No lawyer, whether assigned by the court, part of a legal aid or defender staff, or
privately retained or paid, has any duty to take any steps or present dilatory or frivolous
motions or any actions that are unfounded according to the lawyer's informed
professional judgment. On the contrary, to do so is unprofessional conduct.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Commentary to 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980).
182. PoLk County, 454 U.S. at 323 ("It is the obligation of any lawyer-whether privately
retained or appointed-notto clog the courts with frivolous motions or appeals."). See FED. R. CIv.
P. 11, which provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record .... The signature of an attorney ...
constitutes a certificate by the signer that . . . to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id.
183. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776; Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); see NLADA REPORT, supra note 11.
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defenders typically work under time and resource constraints.'"' The
argument is that the time and money that would be consumed in defending
malpractice suits against public defenders would detract from the already meager
resources available to defend indigents.ts
Initially, this argument is appealing, as large caseloads and small budgets
continue to be among the biggest problems faced by our nation's public defender
offices.'" In a 1990 survey of public defender offices," more than
seventy-five percent of the respondents reported an increase in the number of
plea bargains per attorney as the caseloads have risen, and half of the
respondents felt increased pressure to settle cases due to the increasing
caseloads."n Moreover, of the respondents, sixty-five percent reported that
the heavy caseloads make staff recruitment difficult, and seventy-six percent
reported that burnout due to heavy caseloads makes staff retention difficult."'
However, the survey confirmed that indigent defense funding has not kept up
with the increasing caseloads, as over seventy percent of the respondents felt
that their offices were inadequately funded, and ninety-four percent noted that
184. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 1993); Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
185. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanyingtext (discussing
Dziubak). It has further been argued that because of their large caseloads, public defenders do not
have sufficient time to devote to their cases and therefore are particularly vulnerable to malpractice
suits. Carlson, supra note 12, at 144. See infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text (discussing
and criticizing the argument that malpractice liability will lead to an onslaught of frivolous suits by
indigent defendants).
186. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
(NAC) established maximum caseload limitations for public defender offices. The Commission was
appointed by the administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the
Commission was composed of elected officials, law enforcement officers, and defenders. NLADA
REPORT, supra note 11, at 6. The NAC standards are the most widely visible benchmark in the
effort to describe maximum case limits for a defender staff attorney. Id.
In 1988, the Caseload Subcommittee of the NLADA's Defender Committee surveyed a
selected group of public defender offices to see what the actual caseloads were in comparison to the
NAC standards. ld. at 25. While the NAC standard for felonies per attorney per year was 150, the
survey's respondents reported that the average actual number of felonies handled by individual
attorneys per year was 191. Id. While the NAC standard for misdemeanors per attorney per year
was 400, the average number of misdemeanors actually handled by individual attorneys per year was
613. Id. at 25-26. The survey further found that while the NAC standard for juvenile cases was
200, respondents reported that the average actual number of juvenile cases handled annually by
individual defenders was 417. Id. at 26. While the IAC standard for appeals was 25, respondents
reported that the average number of appeals actually handled annually by individual attorneys was
43. Id.
187. The survey was conducted by the Institute for Law and Justice for the National Institute
of Justice. The Institute for Law and Justice received responses from 194 defender programs across
the country. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
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their budgets were less than prosecutors' budgets for handling indigent
cases. 
190
One cannot deny the existence of these serious problems, and it may be
unfair to subject public defenders to liability for acts stemming from conditions
that are outside the defender's control.' However, it would be even more
unfair for the indigent client to suffer from misrepresentation because of an
under-funded public defender office, as the crisis conditions in most public
defender offices are out of the indigent's control as well." Rather, the
problems of under-funding and excessive caseloads should be borne by society
as a whole, because public defender office deficiencies are caused by larger
social problems, such as increased crime," an economic climate which has
lead to increased claims of indigency and lower state budgets,' and a
190. Id. These crisis conditions which characterize most public defender offices have caused
courts to intervene. Most recently, in State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the indigent defense services in Section E of Orleans Criminal District
Court were so inadequate that a rebuttable presumption arises that indigents in Section E are
receiving counsel insufficient to meet constitutionally required standards. Id. at 791. The court
reasoned that, as the trial court stated, "fn]ot even a lawyer with an S on his chest could effectively
handle [Section E's dockets]." Id. at 789. See supra text accompanying notes 2-10.
191. See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 1993).
192. Id. at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
193. Between 1986 and 1991, crime rates increased 23 percent for murder, non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; while rates increased six percent for
burglary, larceny-theft, motor-vehicle theft, and arson. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE STATE
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1993). Between 1986 and 1991, arrests increased
14 percent. Id. at 3. Moreover, record numbers of people are coming under correctional
supervision. Id. at 5. Between 1986 and 1990, the number of probationers, parolees, prisoners,
and jail inmates grew by nearly 50 percent. Id. While federal, state, and local government spending
for all civil and criminal justice activities increased 63 percent ($29 billion) between 1985 and 1990,
most courts are not keeping pace with the increasing number of criminal cases. Id. at 13, 15.
Fewer states in 1990 than in 1986 disposed of more cases than they filed. Id. at 13.
Further, in the 1990 survey of defender offices conducted by the Institute for Law and Justice
for the National Institute of Justice, public defenders were asked to identify factors contributing to
the increased caseloads. NLADA REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. Among the responses were the
following:
- 88 % of the respondents felt that increased caseloads were caused by an increased number
of drug cases;
- 82% felt that another cause was that prosecutors often overcharge defendants;
- 82% noted that increased sentencing for certain crimes was a problem;
- 79 % reported that the number of attorneys was inadequate for the caseload;
- 78% pointed to a lack of resources;
- 77% said that the number of defenders has not kept pace with the caseloads.
Id.
194. Dzfubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
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negative stigma associated with public defenders' tasks.'" Thus, courts should
not condone the under-funding of public defender offices by reducing public
defenders' obligations to indigent defendants.'"
Moreover, whether an individual claiming official status is granted
immunity depends upon the nature of the individual's duties, the importance of
the office, and whether the individual has policymaking functions." 9 As one
court has stated, "[Immunity] does not turn on the putative effect of the
imposition of the financial burdens attendant to tort liability."1'6 Therefore,
the excessive caseloads and chronic under-funding of public defender offices,
though they may justify different treatment for public defenders, cannot justify
a rule of public defender malpractice immunity.
D. The Promotion of Unfettered Discretion and Fearless Litigation
Does Not Justify Malpractice Immunity
In addition to the unique characteristics of public defender offices as a
justification for immunity, courts granting immunity have relied on the
traditional justification that immunity is necessary to promote fearless litigation
and the exercise of unfettered discretion."9  This unfettered exercise of
discretion is encouraged by freeing public officials from the fear of potential
liability.' Immunity thus promotes the broader public interest of the effective
195. Public defender offices, as part of the local county government, must apply to the local
government each year for their budgets. Mounts, supra note 72, at 482. Because virtually all of
the public defender's clients are charged with serious crimes, the tasks of public defenders are
unpopular, thus, local politicians have little to gain by giving public defender offices large budgets.
Id. at 481-82. Consequently, most public defender offices are severely under-funded. Id. at 482-83.
The limited budgets lead to staff shortages, which ultimately result in excessive caseloads. Id. See
supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
196. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
197. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1979); 67 CJ.S. Officers § 8 (1978); see
supra note 156.
198. Reese, 406 A.2d at 739-740 (emphasis added).
199. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), the second Justice Harlan wrote the
following:
The reasons for the recognition of the privilege have been often stated. It has
been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise their
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course
of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise
be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.
Id.
200. Carlson, supra note 12, at 138. Carlson argues:
Many indigent defendants, particularly repeat offenders, think they are as competent as
attorneys. Therefore, they are likely to tell their attorneys how to conduct the cases.
If the public defenders are afraid of malpractice suits, they may follow the defendants'
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administration of laws.
However, this justification for immunity for governmental officials should
not be applied to public defenders for three reasons. First, public defenders are
not governmental officials but, rather, are more similar in their duties and
obligations to privately retained attorneys."' Second, indemnity, which states
are likely to provide for malpractice awards, both removes the possibility of
deterring recruitment of public defenders,' and assures that public defenders
will vigorously pursue their cases.' Third, as the Ferri Court reasoned, the
threat of possible malpractice liability, rather than inhibiting fearless decision-
maling, would actually have the opposite effect of providing public defenders,
like private attorneys, with an incentive to perform their functions
competently.' A public defender's awareness that negligent acts may lead
to civil liability will keep the defender "on his or her toes. "I Therefore, the
traditional justification that immunity is necessary to promote fearless litigation
should not be applied to public defenders.
advice in order to placate them. At best this means the public defender may be filing
many worthless motions and pursuing frivolous defenses; at worst it means the attorney
is conducting the cases in a manner detrimental to his clients.
Id. at 144.
201. The United States Supreme Court has held that public defenders' duties and obligations
parallel those of privately retained attorneys, who are of course subject to malpractice liability. See
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
The Rules of Professional Conduct echo the Supreme Court view. See ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JusTicE 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980). Further, the public defender's freedom from state control
is part of the right to counsel constitutionally guaranteed under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). See Polk Courty, 454 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345); F& Pane Hough,
150 P.2d 448, 452 (Cal. 1948) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8). See
supra section IV.A, notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
202. See infra section IV.E, notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
203. Dziubakv. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-1003 (West 1993), which provides the following:
§ 5-1003. Indemnity of public defender or assistant public defender. If any injury to
the person or property of another is caused by a public defender or any assistant public
defender, while the public defender or assistant public defender is engaged in the
performance of his duties as such, the county shall indemnify the public defender or
assistant public defender, as the case may be, for any judgment recovered against him
as the result of that injury, except where the injury results from the willful misconduct
of the public defender or assistant public defender, as the case may be ....
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-1003 (West 1993).
204. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 204.
205. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 62, at 1196 ("It seems anomalous to suggest that the
effectiveness of counsel on behalf of a criminal defendant may be weakened by the lawyer's
awareness that incompetence in the criminal defense may lead to civil liability for its consequences;
on the contrary, it should keep him oi his toes.").
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E. The Need to Recruit Competent Public Defenders Does Not Justify
Malpractice Immunity
In addition to deterring fearless and independent decision-making, it is
argued that public defender malpractice immunity is necessary to ensure that
competent counsel remain willing to serve as public defenders.' 6 The
argument is that public defender malpractice liability would be caused largely
by a lack of resources, which is outside the defender's control.'
Consequently, civil liability may deter the recruitment and maintenance of public
defenders.'
While the Ferri Court dismissed as largely speculative the argument that
malpractice liability will affect public defender recruitment,2w empirical data
suggests that heavy caseloads do affect public defender recruitment."'
However, the argument that malpractice liability will deter public defender
recruitment is unrealistic in light of the ever-increasing number of attorneys in
the United States, which is approaching epic proportions." Further, this
206. The Ferri Court called this reason "the most persuasive reason for creating such an
immunity." Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
207. Dzzubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776-77.
208. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776-77 (Minn. 1993).
209. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 201 n.17. The Court concluded:
But respondent has not directed our attention to any empirical data-in judicial
decisions, legislative hearings, or scholarly studies-to support his conclusions that the
risk of malpractice litigation deters members of the private bar from accepting the
representation of indigent defendants or adversely affects the quality of representation.
Id.
210. In the 1990 National Law Institute survey of public defender offices, 65 percent of the
respondents reported that heavy caseloads made staff recruitment difficult, and 76 percent reported
that burnout from heavy caseloads was a major reason for staff retention problems. NLADA
REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. See supra text accompanying note 189.
211. The following table shows the growth in the legal profession on a national scale from 1960
to 1985:
Year Number of Lawyers Ratio of Lawyers to Population
1960 286,000 1/632
1970 355,000 1/572
1980 542,000 1/418
1985 655,000 1/360
NEW ENGLAND BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, LAW AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:
OBSERVATIONS, THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LEGAL EDUCATION, LAW PRACTICE AND THE
NEW ENGLAND ECONOMY 18 (1989). Since 1940, the number of lawyers per 100,000 population
has more than doubled. The Lawsuit Industry-NumberofLawyers and LegalActivity Has Increased
Since the 1940's, FORBES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 304(1) [hereinafter The Lawsuit Indusayl. Over the
past thirty years, the United States' lawyer population has multiplied by an annual rate of 3.64
percent. Daniel Seligman, Ask Mr. Statistics-Increase in the Number of Lawyers, FORTUNE, June
15, 1992, at 159. Presently, about 700,000 lawyers maintain active practices in the United States,
and America has more practicing lawyers than any other country in the world, both in total and in
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deterrence argument ignores the intangible and often idealistic reasons why many
attorneys choose to serve as public defenders. One author noted:212
When public defenders tell their stories about what led them to
their jobs, their voices take on the tones of evangelists.
"All of us do this for reasons that don't boil down to what we
make," [public defender Carol] Burney said. "The compensation is
just not monetary. It's not tangible. It's the feeling you get at the end
of the day. Sometimes nobody appreciates it . . . not even your
client. ,213
In addition, lawyers in general are subject to liability for negligence, and they
obtain insurance against that possibility." 4 Therefore, it cannot plausibly be
maintained that immunity is necessary to avoid deterring attorneys from
becoming public defenders. 2 5 The argument that public defender malpractice
liability will deter the recruitment of public defenders, while supported by some
data, is impractical and unrealistic, and as such cannot justify a rule of public
per capita. The Lawsuit Industry, supra, at 304(1). Overcapacity has indeed become a serious
problem in the legal profession. In 'It's Not a Wonderful Situation," author James Lyons describes
[a] former associate lawyer... who was laid off at ... [a] major Manhattan firm took
a job selling shirts and ties at a men's clothing store. A real estate specialist who earned
$113,000 in his last year of practice, he once bought $500 suits from the company for
which he now works.
James Lyons, "It's Not a Wonderful Situation," FoRBES, Feb. 4, 1991, at 90(3).
The overcrowding of the legal profession could ideally be utilized to solve the problem of
public defenders' excessive caseloads. If public defender offices were more adequately funded,
public defender offices could be more fully staffed, and the caseloads could be better distributed so
as to provide thorough defense services to all indigent defendants. Such a proposal, however, is
beyond the scope of this note.
212. DeNeen L. Brown, For Fairfax Public Defenders, a Tough Job-and a Mission, WASH.
PoST, April 9, 1990, (Metro), at BI.
213. Brown, supra note 212, at BI. Brown further describes:
[Public defender] James Slaughter... has a resume that might open doors at most
prestigious law firms. Slaughter graduated from Yale University and Columbia
University's law school....
The offers from the law firms were open. He could have stepped into a job and
made $50,000 his first year .... But he turned it down to make $23,000 as a Fairfax
public defender.
"I took the job because America's reliance on jailing people is a national tragedy,"
Slaughter said. . . . "I want to spend a few of the early years of my career trying to
protect due process for those accused of crimes in an era so hostile to criminal suspects
Id.
214. Note, Remedying Ineffective Representation by Public Defenders-An Administrative
Alternative to Traditional Civil Actions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 123, 128 (1975) [hereinafter Ineffective
Representation].
215. Id.
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defender malpractice immunity.
F. The Possibility of Opening the Floodgates to Frivolous Claims Does
Not Justify Malpractice Immunity
In addition to the chilling effect on both public defender advocacy and
recruitment, courts have argued that allowing malpractice suits against public
defenders will open the floodgates to frivolous suits by indigent defendants." 6
The argument is that, due to their heavy caseloads, public defenders have neither
the time to give their clients individualized attention, nor the opportunity to
carefully research the law.2"' Consequently, public defenders are particularly
vulnerable to malpractice litigation.21 s Additionally, it is maintained that
because indigents can avoid the costs of litigation by bringing their actions pro
se, they are more likely to bring frivolous suits than those retaining counsel.219
However, this fear, that public defender malpractice liability will open the
floodgates to frivolous suits, is unlikely to materialize for two reasons. First,
the burden of proof in a malpractice action is on the plaintiff, and it is a difficult
burden to meet, particularly in a criminal context. '  Criminal defense
attorneys, like all attorneys, are held to a duty of reasonable care and must
exercise ordinary skill, knowledge, and diligence. " Moreover, with respect
to the causation analysis, some courts have held that, in criminal defense
malpractice, the plaintiff must prove actual innocence to prevail.' Thus,
most public defenders would probably not be sued for malpractice by their
indigent clients as long as they conduct themselves in the vicinity of the required
standard of professional care.'
216. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d
899, 902 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1976) ("Mhe client has no economic incentive
for eschewing frivolous claims. The experience of the federal courts in federal habeas corpus and
§ 1983 litigation demonstrates that indigents more frequently attempt to litigate claims which are
patently without merit than do non-indigent parties.")); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d
103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("Because [the public defender's] services are 'free' indigent
defendants will often pursue claims or motions which have little if any chance of success.").
217. Carlson, supra note 12, at 144.
218. Klein, supra note 15, at 1177. Further, public defenders may be more vulnerable to
professional discipline than other counsel because public defenders represent individuals whose
liberty is at stake. Id. As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, "The criminal defense
bar has a special responsibility to its clients and to this court." United States v. Gerrity, 804 F.2d
1330, 1331 (7th Cir. 1986); see Klein, supra note 15, at 1177.
219. Carlson, supra note 12, at 144; see Minns, 542 F.2d at 902.
220. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 (1989); see supra note 61.
222. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.5, at 722-23. See supra note 69 and accompanying text
(discussing the relevance of innocence to criminal defense malpractice).
223. Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1426.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/9
1994] PUBLIC DEFENDER MALPRACTICE 545
Secondly, because of the heavy burden of proof, the indigent must obtain
counsel to have any chance of success in a malpractice action.' Due to the
indigent's lack of money, the indigent would likely only be able to obtain an
attorney on a contingent fee basis.' Consequently, a suit would doubtfully
be brought unless it was justified and had merit. 6  Thus, "[w]ithout
resources, and quite possibly in confinement, the unhappy client is not likely to
have an easy time mounting a civil action against [the client's] court-appointed
attorney. " '2  Because the fear that malpractice liability would open the
floodgates to frivolous claims is unlikely to materialize, the fear cannot justify
a rule of malpractice immunity.
G. The Availability of Other Remedies Does Not Justify Malpractice
Immunity
Courts granting immunity also argue that if public defenders are granted
malpractice immunity, indigents would not be left without a remedy.' The
immunity doctrine is justified in part by safeguards inherent in the judicial
system that protect any individual interest that may be infringed upon.'
Indigents remain free to appeal their convictions, and the incompetent public
defender may be disciplined by the government and bar association.'
In addition, it is argued that indigent defendants who receive deficient legal
services can, via appealing their convictions or filing habeas corpus actions,
allege ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment."
The legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding
224. Id. at 1426 n.44. See generally Martin T. Fletcher, Note, Standard of Care in Legal
Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771 (1968) (discussing the difficulty and complexity involved in
establishing malpractice).
225. See Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Control, and Enforceability, 47 IowA L.
REv. 942, 943 (1962) ("The most frequently espoused justification for [the contingent fee contract]
is that it provides legal assistance for the destitute claimant who has a meritorious cause of action
but no means of obtaining competent counsel.*).
226. Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1426. See supra note
225.
227. Mallen, supra note 17, at 68-69.
228. Dziubakv. Mot, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 1993); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407
N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
229. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). See supra note 55.
230. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776; Carlson, supra note 12, at 146. For a thorough discussion
of bar association and other types of discipline applicable to public defenders, see Klein, supra note
15. However, it is critical to note that the victim of the alleged misconduct is not a party to
disciplinary proceedings against the attorney. Id. at 1176 (citing Binns v. Board of Bar Overseers,
343 N.E.2d 868 (Mass. 1976)).
231. Carlson, supra note 12, at 146. See supra note 14 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
See supra note 131 for a discussion of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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and for legal malpractice are equivalent, and any conduct that constitutes
ineffective assistance could form the basis for a legal malpractice action, as
negligence underlies both claims.? 2  Due to the availability of these alter-
natives, the argument follows, a malpractice action for damages is unnecessary.
These alternatives available to indigent defendants cannot substitute for a
malpractice action against a negligent public defender. None of the alternatives
result in a civil remedy, which is necessary where the indigent is wrongly
convicted of a crime. If a person is convicted of a crime as a result of
inadequate representation, justice is generally satisfied by the granting of a new
trial? 3  But where, due to deficient representation, an innocent person is
wrongly convicted of a crime and then wrongly incarcerated, justice requires that
the person be compensated for the resulting injury.2 '
Further, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should not substitute
for a claim of malpractice against a public defender for two reasons. First, a
232. HALL, supra note 14, § 27.9, at 727. See also Klein, supra note 15, at 1201 ("[A] court
determination ordering a reversal on ineffectiveness grounds is some reflection that the trial attorney
had failed to use the skill, diligence, and degree of care that would have been exercised by a
reasonably competent attorney in similar circumstances.").
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was held not to preclude a claim of legal
malpractice in Ei Bon Fe Baya Ghananee v. Black, 504 A.2d 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (appointed
counsel), and Quick v. Swem, 568 A.2d 223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (public defender). Moreover,
ineffective assistance was held not to be a pre-requisite to recovering for legal malpractice in Glenn
v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 1991), and Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1989).
Success on an ineffective assistance claim was held not to guarantee success on a malpractice claim
in Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983). But defeat on a claim of ineffective assistance
was held to preclude, in whole or in part, a subsequent malpractice action in Schiffv. Williams, No.
267512, 1991 WL 29349 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1991), and Hockett v. Breunig, 526 N.E.2d 995
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988). See Sarno, supra note 65, §§ 3, 5.
233. Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 1993).
234. Id. (emphasis added). The Bailey court explained:
If a person is found guilty of a crime, and that person is indeed innocent of any degree
of that crime, and it is established that the wrongful conviction was proximately caused
by counsel's gross dereliction in his duty to represent the defendant, only then will the
defendant be able to collect monetary damages. If a person is convicted of a crime
because of the inadequacy of counsel's representation, justice is satisfied by the grant
of a new trial. However, if an innocent person is wrongfully convicted due to the
attorney's dereliction, justice requires that he be compensated for the wrong which has
occurred.
Id. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[lt is far worse
to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
Of course, a claim against a public defender alleging violation of section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321
(1981) (holding that public defenders do not act "under color of" state law when performing the
traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant). See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying
text (discussing Polk County).
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claim of ineffective assistance speaks to the relationship between the defendant
and the state, not between the defendant and the attorney, therefore the attorney
should not be allowed to use the constitutional safeguard of effective assistance
as a liability shield.?5 Second, an ineffective assistance claim results in the
reversal of a conviction or the granting of a new trial, but does not address the
suffering and time spent as a result of an unwarranted conviction.' Thus,
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, like the other alternatives available
to indigents, is an insufficient remedy where the indigent is wrongly convicted
and incarcerated; as a result, a malpractice action becomes the necessary means
of ensuring an indigent's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. 7  For these reasons, the alternative remedies and causes of action
available to an indigent defendant cannot substitute for a malpractice action for
damages against a negligent public defender.
H. Public Defender Malpractice Immunity Violates the Equal
Protection Clause
Finally, public defender malpractice liability is necessary to avoid violating
the Equal Protection Clause.' Writing for the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Illinois,' Justice Black proclaimed: "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' Justice
Black's statement has particular resonance here, for extending malpractice
immunity to public defenders would violate the Equal Protection Clause by
distinguishing among groups of plaintiffs based solely upon their economic
235. Bailey, 621 A.2d at 113-14.
236. Id. at 114; see supra text accompanying note 15. See also Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 777
(Gardebring, J., dissenting):
If the public defender fails in the task of representation, he or she may be subject to an
unfavorable performance appraisal; but the client may be unfairly convicted of a crime
and sentenced to prison. The presence of remedies to overturn the conviction due to
ineffectiveness of counsel cannot fully 'right the wrong' done to someone who may have
spent extended periods of time incarcerated unjustly. I believe that a civil remedy is
needed.
Id. Thus, such a damage remedy may be likened to damages for false imprisonment, which
represent lost time, physical discomfort, and any mental or physical injury. See Ineffective
Representation, supra note 214, at 129 n.30.
237. Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1429. See supra notes
233-34 and accompanying text.
238. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
239. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
240. Id. at 19, cited in Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that attorneys appointed for indigent defendants are not immune from malpractice liability).
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status.
24
'
It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative
duty on the government to remove economic handicaps. 2  Nor does the
clause require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. 3  The
Supreme Court has held that wealth, standing alone, is not a suspect class under
the Equal Protection Clause. '  Thus, courts will usually uphold legislative
actions burdening poor people as a class under the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses, where the government's actions are rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. 5
However, the Supreme Court has stated that lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or economic status are traditionally disfavored. 46 Moreover, courts
will actively review classifications that burden the exercise of fundamental
rights, even when such classifications are based on wealth. 7 Courts have a
separate basis for actively reviewing limitations of fundamental interests,
because fundamental interests are considered to be of such value as to merit
special protection against arbitrary limitations.' The sixth amendment right
241. Klein, supra note 15, at 1200. See also Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979):
Appellee's contention is tantamount to a suggestion that we distinguish between groups
of plaintiffs based on economic status, thus, denying an indigent the tort relief which
would be available to the paying client in a similar fact situation. Such a distinction
would raise troublesome equal protection questions were we to adopt it.
Id. at 740. "Immunity would only permit less zealous representation and deny to those who cannot
afford private counsel an equal remedy for their injuries." Id. at 741 (Roberts, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362
(1963) (Harlan, I., dissenting) ("The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of
poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can
afford.")).
243. Reese, 406 A.2d at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)).
244. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29 ("[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . ").
245. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 14.25, at 753 (4th
ed. 1991).
246. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.").
247. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 245, § 14.25, at 753. The Supreme Court has held that
the government cannot restrict, based on individual wealth, the ability to engage in fundamental
rights. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (holding that state's court fees and
costs for suing for divorce violated indigents' due process rights, as indigents were excluded from
the forum empowered to resolve their disputes); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (invalidatihg state poll tax
which was a pre-requisite to voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding
that state must appoint counsel for an indigent in the first appeal from conviction),
248. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 245, § 14.25, at 755 ("The state may be free to allocate
economic benefits on any economic policy it chooses but the fact that these rights are of fundamental
constitutional magnitude means that they cannot be given only to those who can afford to pay for
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/9
1994] PUBLIC DEFENDER MALPRACTICE 549
to counsel is such a fundamental right.29 Where an indigent is wrongly
convicted of a crime, a civil action for malpractice is the only just remedy that
ensures the indigent's right to effective assistance of counsel.' A grant of
malpractice immunity would thus impinge on the indigent's ability to enforce his
or her sixth amendment right to counsel; therefore, a grant of immunity must
be supported by a compelling governmental interest."
The preceding analysis shows that the rationales advanced in favor of public
defender malpractice immunity are unsound .1 2  Accordingly, a compelling
governmental interest cannot be advanced to justify a rule of public defender
malpractice immunity. Even under a lower level of scrutiny, there is no
legitimate reason to justify a rule of immunity. A public defender's duties and
obligations parallel those of privately retained counsel who, of course, are
subject to malpractice liability. 253 The policy reasons advanced in favor of
immunity-the public defender's inability to choose clients, 254 the public
defender's excessive caseloads and under-funding, the deterrence of both
fearless advocacy' and recruitment of public defenders, 7  and the
possibility of frivolous suits -are unpersuasive. Moreover, the availability
of other alternatives, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, cannot substitute
for a civil remedy where the indigent has been wrongly convicted.'
them.").
249. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("The right of one charged with crime
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours.").
250. This is because indigents' available alternatives, such as claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, do not address the time and suffering spent under the burden of an unwarranted
conviction. See Dziubakv. Mou, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting);
Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113-14 (Pa. 1993). Hence, if an innocent person is wrongly
convicted of a crime and then wrongly incarcerated due to negligent representation, justice requires
that the person be compensated for the wrong that has occurred. Bailey, 621 A.2d at 113. See
supra notes 233-34, 236-37 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that, due to the
fundamental right of all citizens to travel, statutes denying welfare to residents not residing in their
jurisdictions for a minimum of one year are unconstitutional) ("Since the classification here touches
on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting-period
requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.").
252. See supra section IV.A-G, notes 156-237 and accompanying text.
253. See supra section IV.A, notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
254. See supra section V.B, notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
255. See supra section IV.C, notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
256. See supra section IV.D, notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
257. See supra section IV.E, notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
258. See supra section IV.F, notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
259. See supra section IV.G, notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
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Rather, under a rule of public defender malpractice immunity, some people
would be allowed to sue negligent attorneys while others would not.'5 The
sole difference between the two groups of people is their economic status.26
Not only would indigent defendants be unable to choose their own counsel, but
indigents would also be unable to obtain damages if the public defender
negligently represented them.' Public defender malpractice immunity would
create "just the kind of two-tier criminal justice system that the Supreme Court
hoped to obliterate in its landmark decision, [Gideon v. Wainwright]. 2
V. A MODEL STATUTORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENDER
MALPRACTICE LiAirry
The issue of public defender malpractice liability is most appropriately
addressed by legislation, at either the state or federal level. Most of the
arguments advanced either for or against public defender malpractice immunity
are based on public policy, and the process of delicately weighing important
policy considerations should not be undertaken by judges. Rather, legislatures
should make such determinations on the basis of empirical data.' For the
reasons set forth in Section IV of this Note, public defenders should be subject
to malpractice liability.2" However, the public defender is in several respects
distinct from privately retained counsel,2 and thus should be treated
accordingly. The following model statute provides indigent defendants with a
remedy for their public defenders' negligence, while recognizing that public
defenders should be treated somewhat differently from private counsel.
260. See Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel, supra note 51, at 1427.
261. Id. at 1427-28; Mallen, supra note 17, at 69; Klein, supra note 15, at 1200.
262. Klein, supra note 15, at 1200-01. While criminal defendants with funds have the right
to employ counsel of their own choosing, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), the
Supreme Court has held that indigent criminal defendants have no such right. Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 11-14 (1983); see Klein, supra note 15, at 1200-01.
263. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
264. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979). See also Hans A. Linde, Courts and
Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 821, 837 (1994) ("The
legislature 'is a political engine, and the supreme instrument for the making and expression of public
policy.'") (citations omitted).
265. See supra notes 148-263 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text (discussing public defender's inability to
contract with clients) and notes 183-98 and accompanying text (discussing public defender caseloads
and under-funding).
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Liability of Public Defenders for Malpractice
§ 1. Liability. Public defenders shall be held personally liable for acts or
omissions constituting the tort of malpractice, and may not avail themselves
of the defense of immunity.
Comment: This provision recognizes that public defenders should not be
immune from malpractice liability. Public defenders' unique characteristics,
such as their inability to choose clients and their excessive caseloads and under-
funding, while justifying somewhat different treatment for public defenders,'
cannot justify a rule of malpractice immunity. An attorney's duty to act with
reasonable care exists independently from contractual duties, and ethical
considerations limit all permissible advocacy.' Moreover, it would be unfair
to punish the indigent defendant for the inadequacies in public defender offices,
which are caused by larger problems out of both the defender's and the indigent
defendant's control.' Further, immunity turns not on the effect of imposing
liability, but rather on the office and duties involved.' As stated by the
United States Supreme Court, public defenders' duties and obligations closely
parallel those of privately retained counsel; therefore public defenders, like
private attorneys, should be subject to malpractice liability."
The policy arguments advanced in favor of immunity are unpersuasive.
The threat of malpractice liability, rather than inhibiting fearless decision-making
and independent advocacy, will provide public defenders with an incentive to
perform their duties effectively.' Due to the ever-increasing number of
attorneys in the United States, and given the idealistic reasons why many
attorneys choose to become public defenders, public defender recruitment will
not be adversely affected by a rule of malpractice liability.'m Further, due to
the difficult standard of proof in criminal malpractice cases, and the resulting
need for counsel in such cases, malpractice liability will not lead to an onslaught
of frivolous malpractice suits against public defenders. 74 Malpractice liability
is also necessary to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause by distinguishing
between groups of plaintiffs based solely upon their economic status.'
267. See infra text accompanying notes 276-84.
268. See supra section IV.B, notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
269. See supra section IV.C, notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
271. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
204 (1979). See supra section V.A, notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
272. See supra section IV.D, notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
273. See supra section IV.E, notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
274. See supra section IV.F, notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
275. See supra section IV.H, notes 238-63 and accompanying text.
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§ 2. Burden of Proof. To recover damages for malpractice against a
public defender, the plaintiff must, except as provided in Section 2(C) and
Section 3, allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence:
A. that the public defender was appointed by the State to represent
the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding;
B. that the public defender committed acts or omissions in
representing the plaintiff that fell below the standard of representation
of a reasonable public defender under similar circumstances;
C. that the public defender's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff
to be incarcerated; that is, but for the public defender's conduct, the
plaintiff would not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crime charged or a lesser included offense; 7 6 and
D. that the plaintiff suffered actual damages as defined in Section 4.
276. In Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993), which dealt with malpractice against
criminal defense attorneys in general, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required that the plaintiff
prove as part of the proximate cause element that, but for the attorney's conduct, the plaintiff would
have obtained acquittal or dismissal of the charges. Id. at 115.
An example of the use of the reasonable doubt standard in a civil action for damages can be
found in a recent Senate bill, which proposed a civil cause of action for sexual assault victims
against producers, distributors, and sellers of obscene materials. The bill provided the following:
See. 4. Cause of Action.
(a) Cause of Action.-A victim of a sex offense .. may bring a civil action in
a United States district court or a State court against a producer, distributor, exhibitor,
renter or seller of obscene material or child pornography . . . to recover damages
suffered as a result of a sex offense.
(c) Elements of the Cause of Action-To recover in a civil action brought under
subsection (a), the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence (except as
provided in paragraphs (1)(B) ... ) that-
(1) the victim was a victim of a sex offense for which-
(A) the sex offender was convicted; or
(B) if the sex offender was not convicted and is
deceased, the plaintiff establishes beyond a reasonable doubt in
the civil action that the sexual offense was committed by the sex
offender against the victim;
(2) exposure of the offender to obscene material or child pornography
was a substantial cause of the offense;
(3) the defendant is-
(A)(i) a producer or distributor of obscene material.
or
(ii) an exhibitor, renter, or seller ofobscenematerial ....
S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (a), (c) (1992) (emphasis added).
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Comment: This portion of the statute, recognizing that public defenders should
be treated somewhat differently than privately retained counsel, imposes a
difficult standard of proof on potential plaintiffs. Though bound by ethical
considerations, ' public defenders, unlike private attorneys, may not decide
whether to accept a case based on the defender's current workload.' In
addition, due to factors outside the control of both the indigent client and the
defender, public defenders are overworked, and public defender offices are
under-funded. 2  Thus, while the unique characteristics of public defenders
do not justify a rule of malpractice immunity, they nevertheless require that
public defenders be treated somewhat uniquely for purposes of malpractice
liability.
Hence, under this statute, the plaintiff has a particularly difficult burden of
proof. Subject to an exception, the plaintiff must prove the elements of
malpractice by clear and convincing evidence." In addition, due to the nature
of the public defender's duties, the public defender is held to the higher standard
of a criminal law specialist. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the acts in
question fell below the standard of a reasonable public defender in similar
circumstances.
The proximate cause element requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she
is innocent not only of the crime charged, but also of any lesser included
offenses-thus, that the plaintiff was wrongly convicted and incarcerated due to
the public defender's negligence. This element is based on the fact that a civil
remedy is necessary only where the indigent defendant is wrongly convicted of
a crime. If an innocent person is wrongly convicted and incarcerated due to
negligent representation, justice requires that the person be compensated for the
resulting injury.' Because the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,'m here the plaintiff must show that he or she
277. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying note 173.
279. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 171-98 and accompanying text.
281. Clear and convincing proof is that which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the
ultimate fact in controversy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
It is a level of proof which requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Clear and convincing proof will be shown where the truth of the
facts asserted is highly probable. Id.
282. Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 1993). See supra notes 233-34 and accomp-
anying text. Alternatives such as ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient in such situations,
because a successful ineffective assistance claim results in the reversal of a conviction or the granting
of a new trial, but does not address the suffering and time spent as a result of an unwarranted
conviction. Bailey, 621 A.2d at 114. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 236-37.
283. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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would not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
§ 3. Effect of Showing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The plaintiff's showing that the public defender's assistance was ineffective
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, which showing results in the grant of
a new trial, shall create a rebuttable presumption as to Sections 2(A) and
2(B) of this statute. A finding of ineffective assistance of counsel which
results in either the reversal of the plaintiff's conviction, or the grant of a
new trial resulting in the acquittal of the plaintiff of the crime charged and
any lesser included offense, shall create a rebuttable presumption as to
Sections 2(A), 2(B), and 2(C) of this statute.
Comment: This portion of the statute recognizes that the causes of action of
malpractice and ineffective assistance of counsel are equivalent.' Any
conduct that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel could form the basis of
a malpractice action, as a failure to act with reasonable care underlies both
claims. Hence, a showing of ineffective assistance should be recognized as a
strong indication that the public defender's acts constituted actionable
malpractice.
Where the ineffective assistance claim results in the grant of a new trial, it
indicates that the public defender's conduct was not reasonable under the
circumstances. 26 Thus, the effect of the statute here is to ease the plaintiff's
burden in the malpractice action on the issues of the defender's duty of care and
violation of that duty. However, in such a situation, the plaintiff must still
affirmatively show that, but for the defender's negligence, the plaintiff would
not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as required in Section
2(C).
However, if the finding of ineffective assistance results in either the
reversal of a conviction, or the granting of a new trial which results in an
acquittal of all charges, this indicates not only the unreasonableness of the
defender's conduct, but that the plaintiff's guilt has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hence, the effect of the statute here is to relieve the plaintiff
of his or her burden of proof on the Section 2(C) innocence element. This is
284. See supra note 276. This statutory provision should be distinguished from a malicious
prosecution cause of action. The gist of that action is that the plaintiff has been wrongfully made
the subject of legal process by the defendant,for the sole purpose of vexing or injuring the plaintiff.
54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 5 (1987) (emphasis added).
285. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 131 for a discussion of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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achieved by creating a rebuttable presumption in the malpractice action on the
issues of the defender's duty, violation, and proximate cause.
§ 4. Damages.
(a) Damages shall reflect lost time, lost wages, physical, and/or
mental injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of being unjustly
incarcerated.
(b) If a public defender is found liable for malpractice under Section
2 of this statute, the state shall indemnify the public defender for
the judgment, except where the plaintiff's injury results from the
willful misconduct of the public defender.'
Comment: (a) The damage provision again recognizes that the civil remedy of
malpractice is necessary where the plaintiff has been unjustly convicted and
incarcerated.' In the absence of damages relating to a wrongful conviction
and incarceration, the ineffective assistance remedy is sufficient. However,
where an innocent person is wrongly convicted and incarcerated due to the
public defender's negligence, the ineffective assistance cause of action is
insufficient. Rather, justice requires that the person be compensated for lost
time, lost wages, and physical or mental injuries. Therefore, this portion of the
statute provides for damages similar to false imprisonment damages. 2'
(b) The rule of public defender malpractice liability set forth in Sections
1 and 2 of this statute is in part a reflection that the inadequacies characteristic
of most public defender offices should not be borne by indigent defendants, as
excessive caseloads and under-funding are not within the indigents' control.2
This provision, modelled after Illinois' public defender indemnity statute, 29'
recognizes that these inadequacies should not be borne by the individual
defenders either. Under-funding and excessive caseloads are caused by larger
287. It is true that most public defenders' malpractice liability insurance is paid for by the state.
However, that is not the dispositive issue here. Rather, the issue is whether liability should be
attributed to the state, in which case the damages come out of the state treasury, or whether liability
should be attributed to the individual defender, in which case the damages come out of the
defender's liability insurance, which may in fact be paid for by the state. The former proposition
is the thesis of this note and the rationale underlying this statutory provision. The issue of liability
insurance per se is beyond the scope of this note.
288. See supra notes 233-34, 236-37 and accompanying text.
289. See Ineffecgive Representation, supra note 214, at 129 n.30.
290. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
291. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-1003 (West 1993). See supra note 203 for the text of
the Illinois public defender indemnity statute.
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social problems.' This indemnity provision is a reflection that these
problems should be borne not by the indigent client, nor by the individual
defender, but by society as a whole. However, if the individual defender's
conduct is found to be willful, the injustice done to the indigent defendant is no
longer caused by the larger societal problems, but rather is the fault of the
individual defender. Accordingly, where the defender's misconduct is willful,
the state should not be required to indemnify the public defender for resulting
damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it cannot be denied that the inadequacies present in most public
defender offices are at crisis proportions, the immunity question turns not on the
effect of imposing liability, but rather on the office and duties involved. In this
respect, public defenders are essentially state-paid private attorneys and, like
private attorneys, they should be subject to malpractice liability. However,
unlike private attorneys, public defenders are unable to choose their clients.
Public defenders are also plagued by unmanageable caseloads and grossly limited
budgets, both of which are caused by larger societal ills outside the control of
both the public defenders and the indigent clients. The model statute proposed
in this Note effectively strikes a balance between the indigent defendant's right
to recover damages for malpractice, and the unique characteristics of modern
public defender offices.
David J. Richards
292. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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